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POST-SENTENCING APPELLATE WAIVERS
Kevin Bennardo*
A sentencing appellate waiver is a criminal defendant’s promise not to appeal her
sentence. These provisions routinely appear in federal defendants’ plea agreements.
With a few narrow exceptions, a knowing and voluntary sentencing appellate
waiver bars a defendant from appealing all issues within the waiver’s scope. Using
models of judicial behavior and empirical studies, this Article argues that the inclu-
sion of sentencing appellate waivers in plea agreements creates bargaining
inefficiencies and removes important incentives from the sentencing process. As a
solution, the Article proposes that sentencing appellate waivers should take the form
of separate post-sentencing agreements.
INTRODUCTION
Since their popular inception approximately twenty years ago,
sentencing appellate waivers have become more prevalent than
ever in the federal courts. These waivers, executed as part of a de-
fendant’s plea agreement, relinquish the defendant’s right to
appeal her yet-to-be-imposed sentence. This Article argues that the
timing of these waivers is problematic. By pre-dating sentencing by
months, these waivers are inefficient and skew the incentives of the
stakeholders in the sentencing process in troubling ways: the parties
cannot accurately value their rights during the bargaining process;
district courts know the sentence is virtually unreviewable and
therefore lack incentives to observe proper sentencing practices;
and the government cannot impose meaningful consequences on a
breaching defendant, thereby reducing the likelihood that defend-
ants will adhere to their waiver agreements.
Postponing sentencing appellate waiver agreements until after
sentencing would rectify these ills and conserve appellate resources.
Under this proposed system, the defendant and the government
could negotiate over a separate post-sentencing appellate waiver in
exchange for a sentence reduction subject to the approval of the
district court.
* Visiting Associate Clinical Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney
School of Law. The research for this Article was completed during the author’s tenure as a
Teaching Fellow at the Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center, and the
author extends great appreciation to that institution for its support. The author is especially
thankful to Bill Corbett, Mark Glover, and Ken Levy for their thoughtful comments.
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Part I of this Article sets forth the mechanics of the current sys-
tem of plea agreement sentencing appellate waivers. Part II
recounts the numerous criticisms of the current appellate waiver
system and the federal courts of appeals’ refutation of these criti-
ques. Part III uses models of judicial decision-making to
hypothesize the likely effect of sentencing appellate waivers on the
sentencing process. That Part concludes that a district court’s
knowledge that a sentencing appellate waiver exists influences sen-
tencing procedures and outcomes. Part IV establishes the
mechanics of the proposed post-sentencing appellate waiver system,
describes its advantages compared to the current system, and re-
sponds to anticipated criticisms. Instead of permitting “a lawless
district court”1 to deviate from proper sentencing practices, the
proposed post-sentencing appellate waiver system incentivizes law-
fulness while vindicating the parties’ freedom to engage in self-
interested bargaining.
I. MECHANICS OF SENTENCING APPELLATE WAIVERS
Appellate waiver provisions rose to popularity in the 1990s2 and
are today common components of plea agreements in many federal
districts.3 The garden-variety appellate waiver is a provision in a de-
fendant’s plea agreement that waives the defendant’s right to
appeal her conviction, her sentence, or both.4 The parties are free
to customize these waivers on a case-by-case basis, and, as a result,
the waivers vary widely in scope from broad blanket waivers of “all”
1. Memorandum from Acting Ass’t Att’y Gen. John C. Keeney for all United States
Attorneys (Oct. 4, 1995), reprinted in 10 FED. SENT’G REP. 209, 210 (1998).
2. Noted reasons for the rise of appellate waivers include (1) the high number of sen-
tencing appeals in the wake of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, (2) the federal appellate
courts’ positive reception of appellate waivers, and (3) the above-cited Keeney memorandum
advising federal prosecutors to consider including appellate waivers in plea agreements.
Catharine M. Goodwin, Summary: 1996 Committee on Criminal Law Memo on Waivers of Appeal
and Advisement of the Rights to Appeal, 10 FED. SENT’G REP. 212, 212 (1998); see also Memoran-
dum from Acting Ass’t Att’y Gen. John C. Keeney for all United States Attorneys, supra note
1, at 210 (urging that “the use of these waivers in appropriate cases can be helpful in reduc-
ing the burden of appellate and collateral litigation involving sentencing issues.”).
3. An empirical study of 971 federal plea agreements in 2003 found that almost two-
thirds contained an appellate waiver provision. Nancy J. King & Michael E. O’Neill, Appeal
Waivers and the Future of Sentencing Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209, 212 (2005); see also Robert K.
Calhoun, Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 127, 211 (1995) (labeling
appellate waivers “a dominant feature of the plea bargaining landscape”).
4. An empirical study found that a little less than two-thirds of appellate waivers include
the right to appeal both the sentence and conviction, while a little more than one third
barred review of the sentence only. King & O’Neill, supra note 3, at 242–43. Pressure to waive
appellate rights is reportedly most intense in the area of sentencing appeals. See Calhoun,
supra note 3, at 135.
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appellate rights to individually-tailored waivers in which the defen-
dant retains the right to appeal specified aspects of the sentence
under particular conditions.5
The plea-bargaining and guilty-plea processes predate the sen-
tencing hearing by weeks if not months. At the plea hearing, also
known as the “Rule 11 hearing,” the parties are required to disclose
to the district court that a plea agreement exists.6 Federal plea
agreements may take one of three forms: (1) binding on the gov-
ernment to dismiss or forego charges, (2) binding on the
government to recommend (or not oppose) a particular sentence
or calculation under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, and (3) bind-
ing on the court to impose a particular sentence or reach a
particular calculation under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.7
Under the first type, the district court is free to accept or reject the
plea agreement, and the defendant can withdraw her guilty plea if
the government does not uphold its end of the bargain.8 Under the
second type, the defendant is again free to withdraw the plea if the
5. Roger W. Haines, Jr., Waiver of the Right to Appeal Under the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, 3 FED. SENT’G REP. 227, 229 (1991) (describing various limitations the parties could
elect to put on the waiver, such as “retaining the right to appeal if the court departs upward,
or if the court refuses to give credit for acceptance of responsibility”); Kevin Bennardo, A
Frank Look at Appellate Waiver in the Seventh Circuit, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 531, 531–32, 532 n.4
(2012) (listing examples of restrictive waivers); see Goodwin, supra note 2, at 212–13 (provid-
ing examples of “relatively narrow” waivers, “such as where a defendant waives the right to
appeal only if he or she receives a sentence within the range which both parties agree is
appropriate”); see also King & O’Neill, supra note 3, at 244 (finding that only twenty-one
percent of appellate waivers place no limitations on the waiver, while the most common
limitations are the retention of the right to appeal an upward departure from the Guidelines
range (36.5% of waivers), a sentence above the statutory maximum (28.9%), ineffective assis-
tance of counsel (28.6%), and a sentence above a specified range (22.8%)). Companion
provisions to an appellate waiver may include waivers of the defendant’s right to collaterally
attack her conviction or sentence through habeas corpus or the right to move for a later
reduction of sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2012). In the same study noted
above, almost eighty percent of the defendants who had waived the right to appeal had also
waived collateral review. King & O’Neill, supra note 3, at 242–43. The federal appellate courts
have similarly held collateral attack waivers enforceable. See, e.g., DeRoo v. United States, 223
F.3d 919, 923 (8th Cir. 2000) (“As a general rule, we see no reason to distinguish the enforce-
ability of a waiver of direct-appeal rights from a waiver of collateral-attack rights in the plea
agreement context.”). A pleading defendant may also waive the right to seek relief through a
section 3582(c) motion, which seeks a reduction of sentence based on the reduction of a
sentencing range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual. See United States v. Gordon,
480 F.3d 1205, 1208 (10th Cir. 2007) (plea agreement contained an explicit waiver of right to
move for a sentence reduction under section 3582(c)); cf. United States v. Monroe, 580 F.3d
552, 558–59 (7th Cir. 2009) (without a specific provision addressing section 3582(c), appel-
late and collateral attack waivers did not bar motion under section 3582(c)); United States v.
Chavez-Salais, 337 F.3d 1170, 1173 (10th Cir. 2003).
6. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(2).
7. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1).
8. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(A), (3)(A), (4), (5).
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government breaches by failing to make the agreed-upon recom-
mendation. The court is, however, free to ignore the
recommendation, and the defendant may not withdraw her guilty
plea merely because the court imposed a harsher punishment than
was recommended.9 Under the third type, known as a “C” plea be-
cause of its home in subpart C of Rule 11, the district court is
bound to adhere to the parties’ recommendation if it accepts the
plea agreement.10 The defendant is free to withdraw her plea if the
district court rejects the plea agreement.11
At the plea hearing, the district court must ensure that the defen-
dant understands the host of rights that she is foregoing by
pleading guilty, a process known as the plea colloquy.12 If the plea
agreement contains an appellate waiver provision, the district court
must specifically question the defendant about the appellate waiver
during the plea colloquy.13 Only upon finding that the defendant is
entering her guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily may the district
court accept the defendant’s guilty plea.14
District courts are not bound to accept any plea agreements.
Thus, district court judges are free to categorically reject plea agree-
ments that contain appellate waiver provisions.15 Moreover, district
courts may reject appellate waiver provisions in specific cases if ei-
ther the defendant fails to understand the significance of the
9. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(B), (3)(B).
10. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C), (3)(A), (4).
11. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(5), (d)(2).
12. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1).
13. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(N).
14. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2). The court must also determine the existence of a factual
basis for the guilty plea, but that determination need only precede the entry of judgment.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3).
15. See Douglas A. Berman, Windows into Sentencing Policy and Practice: The Crack/Cocaine
Ratio and Appeal Waivers, 10 FED. SENT’G REP. 179, 181 (1998); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)
(granting district courts the authority to reject plea agreements). Judges Greene and Fried-
man of the District Court for the District of Columbia categorically refused to accept plea
agreements containing waivers of the right to appeal unknown and yet-to-be-imposed
sentences. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 992 F. Supp. 437, 438–40 (D.D.C. 1997); United
States v. Raynor, 989 F. Supp. 43, 48–49 (D.D.C. 1997). In the District of Massachusetts,
Judge Gertner found appellate waivers unacceptably violative of public policy. United States
v. Perez, 46 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64–72 (D. Mass. 1999). Although the Fifth Circuit held appellate
waivers enforceable, it explicitly noted that “there may be sound policy reasons for refusing
to accept such waivers, and that district courts might disagree with the policy choice made by
the court in this case to accept a plea agreement appeal waiver.” United States v. Melancon,
972 F.2d 566, 568 (5th Cir. 1992).
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provision16 or the district court believes that the provision does not
serve the interests of justice.17
After a defendant enters a guilty plea, a probation officer creates
a presentence investigation report.18 This report contains a calcula-
tion of the defendant’s advisory sentencing range from the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual.19 The defendant can object to in-
formation contained in the presentence investigation report,
including the probation officer’s Guidelines calculation.20 At the
sentencing hearing, the district court must resolve any disputes re-
garding the presentence investigation report21 and calculate the
defendant’s advisory Guidelines range of imprisonment on the re-
cord.22 The court may receive evidence and witness testimony at the
sentencing hearing,23 and the resulting factual determinations may
bear heavily on the Guidelines calculation.24 Although the district
court is not bound to impose a sentence within the Guidelines
range,25 a sentence within the Guidelines range receives a presump-
tion of reasonableness on appeal in the majority of circuits.26 The
district court often enters judgment on the same day as sentencing.
A defendant has fourteen days following the entry of judgment to
file a notice of appeal.27
The federal courts of appeals have uniformly held that appellate
waiver provisions are enforceable,28 including waiver of the right to
16. See, e.g., United States v. Soon Dong Han, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1045 (N.D. Cal.
2002) (finding the specific defendant’s waiver was not knowing and voluntary).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Vanderwerff, No. 12-cr-00069, 2012 WL 2514933, at *5–6
(D. Colo. June 28, 2012) (rejecting plea agreement because the court found that the defen-
dant’s circumstances did not justify the appellate waiver provision contained therein).
18. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c), (d).
19. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(1).
20. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(f).
21. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(3).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) (2012); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (“[A]
district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable
Guidelines range.”).
23. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(2).
24. Many Guidelines calculations turn on factual findings, such as the degree of bodily
injury the victim suffered, the dollar amount of the victim’s loss, or whether a firearm was
discharged, brandished, possessed, or otherwise used in the course of the offense. E.g., U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1(b)(2), (3), (7) (2013) (robbery offense guideline).
25. The Guidelines were downgraded to “advisory” status in United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
26. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993–94 & n.9 (9th Cir. 2008) (listing cases of
other circuits but declining to adopt such a presumption of reasonableness); see also Rita v.
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007) (permitting the federal courts of appeal to apply a
presumption of reasonableness to a sentence within a properly-calculated Guidelines range).
27. FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1)(A).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Guillen, 561 F.3d 527, 529–31 (D.C. Cir. 2009); United
States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1318, 1324–28 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam);
United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889–92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc); United States v.
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appeal sentencing error.29 Because an appellate waiver only pre-
cludes a defendant from appealing issues that fall within the scope
of the waiver,30 a defendant does not violate an appellate waiver
agreement until she files an opening brief raising a waived issue as
the basis for her appeal. Although the mechanics vary by circuit, a
common system of appellate waiver enforcement requires a govern-
ment motion to dismiss the defendant’s appeal once the defendant-
appellant files her opening brief.31 After permitting the defendant-
appellant to respond to the motion, the appellate court will gener-
ally rule on the motion to dismiss before requiring the government
to file a response to the defendant’s appellate brief.32
Appellate waivers are generally enforced as long as the appealed
issue is within the scope of the waiver and the defendant entered
Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 21–23 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 560–62 (3d
Cir. 2001); United States v. Schmidt, 47 F.3d 188, 190–92 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Ashe, 47 F.3d 770, 775–76 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Yemitan, 70 F.3d 746, 747–48 (2d
Cir. 1995); United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 567 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 52–53 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318,
321–22 (9th Cir. 1990).
29. See Calhoun, supra note 3, at 143 (describing the federal courts’ approach to sen-
tencing appellate waivers as “very expansive”).
30. Matters that fall outside of the scope of an appellate waiver are not waived. See, e.g.,
United States v. Corso, 549 F.3d 921, 927 (3d Cir. 2008). Courts construe appellate waivers
narrowly and resolve any ambiguities “in favor of a defendant’s appellate rights.” Andis, 333
F.3d at 890 (8th Cir. 2003); see also Khattak, 273 F.3d at 562 (“[W]aivers of appeals should be
strictly construed.”); Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325; United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 556 (2d Cir.
1996). But see United States v. Quintero, 618 F.3d 746, 750 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e will en-
force a waiver only if the disputed appeal falls within the general ambit of the waiver.”)
(emphasis added).
31. For example, the Sixth Circuit “strongly encourage[s] the government to promptly
file a motion to dismiss the defendant’s appeal where the defendant waived his appellate
rights as part of a plea agreement.” United States v. McGilvery, 403 F.3d 361, 363 (6th Cir.
2005). Other circuits have established similar procedures. See, e.g., Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1328
(evaluating appellate waiver enforcement before the filing of substantive briefs); United
States v. Marin, 961 F.2d 493, 494 (4th Cir. 1992) (granting the government’s motion to
dismiss the appeal on the basis of an appellate waiver).
32. Rather than entering an order of dismissal, some appellate courts take the more
questionable step of affirming the district court’s judgment when enforcing an appellate
waiver. E.g., Khattak, 273 F.3d at 563 (enforcing appellate waiver and affirming on basis of
lack of jurisdiction); Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 319.
The sua sponte enforcement of appellate waivers on the court’s own initiative is a similarly
questionable practice because appellate waivers are not properly regarded as jurisdictional.
But see Schmidt, 47 F.3d at 190 (dismissing appeal on the basis of appellate waiver even though
the government did not seek enforcement of the waiver). Some courts improperly consider
appellate waivers as jurisdictional. E.g., Khattak, 273 F.3d at 563 (stating that enforcement of
defendant’s appellate waiver deprived the court of “jurisdiction to consider the merits of his
appeal”). But see Schmidt, 47 F.3d at 194 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (“It is not our task to insist on
a bargain that the government, the only party which might benefit from it, does not want to
enforce.”); Nunez v. United States, 546 F.3d 450, 452 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he United States,
as the waiver’s beneficiary, may freely give up its protection.”); Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1320–24
(asserting jurisdiction despite a valid appellate waiver).
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into the waiver knowingly and voluntarily. The federal appellate
courts have, however, carved out narrow exceptions to the opera-
tion of appellate waivers. Notwithstanding a valid appellate waiver,
the appellate courts will entertain an appeal on the grounds that
the defendant was sentenced in excess of the statutory maximum33
or based on an impermissible factor, such as race.34 Additionally,
some circuits will refuse to enforce an appellate waiver if enforcing
the waiver would constitute a “miscarriage of justice.”35 The Fourth
Circuit declined to enforce an otherwise valid appellate waiver
33. See, e.g., United States v. Gibson, 356 F.3d 761, 765 (7th Cir. 2004); Teeter, 257 F.3d at
25 n.10; Marin, 961 F.2d at 496. Further, a sentence below the statutory minimum can pro-
vide for an appeal despite a valid appellate waiver. Cf. United States v. Cieslowski, 410 F.3d
353, 363 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that an agreed-upon sentence “must comply with the maxi-
mum (and minimum, if there is one) provided by the statute of conviction”); Andis, 333 F.3d
at 891–92 (describing illegal sentences as those that fall outside the statutory limits).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Guillen, 561 F.3d 527, 531 (D.C. Cir. 2009); United States v.
Brown, 232 F.3d 399, 403 (4th Cir. 2000); see also Goodwin, supra note 2, at 212 (“[C]ertain
issues are never waived, such as sentences which are plainly illegal because they . . . [are]
based on a factor such as race, gender or religion.”) (internal footnotes omitted).
35. Teeter, 257 F.3d at 25–26 (stating that what constitutes a miscarriage of justice “is
more a concept than a constant” and identifying non-exclusive factors: “the clarity of the
error, its gravity, its character (e.g., whether it concerns a fact issue, a sentencing guideline,
or a statutory maximum), the impact of the error on the defendant, the impact of correcting
the error on the government, and the extent to which the defendant acquiesced in the re-
sult.”); Khattak, 273 F.3d at 563 (adopting the Teeter factors); cf. Andis, 333 F.3d at 891
(cautioning that the miscarriage of justice exception is a “narrow one” and listing non-ex-
haustive examples such as a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum or fails to comply
with the plea agreement); Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327 (limiting the miscarriage of justice excep-
tion to: (1) a sentence imposed on account of an impermissible factor such as race, (2)
ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the negotiation of the waiver, (3) a sen-
tence that exceeds the statutory maximum, or (4) a waiver that is otherwise unlawful such
that the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings).
Courts and scholars have critiqued the miscarriage of justice exception for its vagueness
and inconsistent administration. See Andis, 333 F.3d at 895–96 (Arnold, J., concurring) (stat-
ing that the difficulty of applying the vague miscarriage of justice exception on a case by case
basis creates inefficiencies that undermine the purpose of appellate waivers); Hahn, 359 F.3d
at 1344 n.9 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (criticizing the miscarriage of justice exception because
its vagueness encourages defendants with appellate waivers to appeal and discourages the
government from entering into appellate waiver agreements); Kristine Malmgren Yeater,
Note, Third Circuit Appellate Waivers: The Mysterious Miscarriage of Justice Standard, 1 DUQ. CRIM.
L.J. 94, 94, 103 (2010) (criticizing the Third Circuit’s application of the miscarriage of justice
exception as ill-defined and inconsistent); Derek Teeter, Comment, A Contracts Analysis of
Waivers of the Right to Appeal in Criminal Plea Bargains, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 727, 728 (2005)
(labeling the miscarriage of justice exception “unworkable, unpredictable, and unfair to de-
fendants and prosecutors”). One troubling formulation is the D.C. Circuit’s statement that a
miscarriage of justice occurs “[i]f, for example, the district court utterly fails to advert to the
factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Guillen, 561 F.3d at 531. This broad formulation devalues
appellate waivers. Defendants often allege that the district court failed to adhere to the statu-
tory sentencing factors of subsection 3553(a). Resolution of this issue would require the
appellate court to fully consider the sentencing record to determine whether a miscarriage of
justice occurred, thereby nullifying the resource-saving benefit of the appellate waiver.
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where the defendant claimed a denial of the right to assistance of
counsel at sentencing.36 Other circuits have not been so charitable
and have routinely found that appellate waivers bar a later claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing.37 Appellate claims of
other constitutional violations—such as violation of the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
or the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy clause—are not recog-
nized as exceptions to appellate waivers.38
The defendant can always appeal issues concerning the validity
of the plea agreement or of the waiver itself because such issues
relate to the knowing and voluntary nature of the agreement.39 For
example, the waiver agreement cannot relinquish a claim that the
plea agreement itself was the product of ineffective assistance of
counsel because, if the claim is successful, the plea agreement—
including the waiver—is itself invalid.40 Likewise, an appellate
waiver does not preclude a claim that the sentence imposed vio-
lated the terms of the plea agreement41 or that the government
breached its obligations under the plea agreement.42 These matters
are not exceptions to the waiver but rather are considerations bear-
ing on a waiver’s effectiveness. Thus, unless an exception or a
36. United States v. Attar, 38 F.3d 727, 732–33 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that an appel-
late waiver did not preclude challenge to the sentence where the district court permitted the
defense attorney to withdraw at the beginning of the sentencing hearing and defendant pro-
ceeded pro se).
37. See, e.g., United States v. White, 307 F.3d 336, 343 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[A]n ineffective
assistance of counsel argument survives a waiver of appeal only when the claimed assistance
directly affected the validity of that waiver or the plea itself.”); Mason v. United States, 211
F.3d 1065, 1069 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Djelevic, 161 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 1998)
(per curiam) (“emphatically reject[ing]” the defendant’s contention that claims of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel relating to sentencing cannot be waived).
38. United States v. Davey, 550 F.3d 653, 658 (7th Cir. 2008) (“We see no reservation in
that waiver for constitutional arguments.”); see also King & O’Neill, supra note 3, at 249 &
n.131 (finding cases in ten circuits enforcing appellate waivers against defendants’ claims
that their sentences violated their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights).
39. See Calhoun, supra note 3, at 140–41; Kevin Bennardo, supra note 5, at 534–35, 535
n.14 (listing Seventh Circuit cases).
40. See, e.g., Guillen, 561 F.3d at 530 (“[B]ecause the defendant’s attorney failed to en-
sure the defendant understood the consequences of his waiver, the waiver was not knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary.”).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 25 n.10 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v.
Michelsen, 141 F.3d 867, 872 & n.3 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912
F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1990).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 16 F.3d 985, 990 (9th Cir. 1993) (“By opposing
the acceptance of responsibility adjustment, the government by its breach of the agreement
released [the defendant] from his promise in paragraph 11 not to appeal.”); United States v.
Schwartz, 511 F.3d 403, 405 (3d Cir. 2008). But see Bennardo, supra note 5, at 541–44 (noting
inconsistent precedent in the Seventh Circuit regarding the effect of the government’s
breach of the plea agreement on a defendant’s appellate waiver).
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meritorious claim of invalidity exists, a knowing and voluntary ap-
pellate waiver will bar the appellate court from considering any
claims within its scope.43
II. PREVIOUS CRITIQUES AND JUSTIFICATIONS OF
SENTENCING APPELLATE WAIVERS
In upholding the enforceability of appellate waivers, numerous
courts have pointed to the statutory origin of criminal defendants’
appellate rights.44 Criminal defendants possessed no right to appeal
in the federal system until the end of the nineteenth century.45 The
right to meaningful appellate review of sentencing extends back
only as far as the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.46 According to
these courts, if a defendant can waive constitutional rights such as
the right to a jury trial, she can surely waive a statutory right such as
the right to appeal. This syllogism is demonstrably flawed: an indi-
vidual’s ability to waive a right does not depend on whether the
right’s origins are constitutional or statutory.47 Effective waivers of
43. Although the government is capable of waiving its appellate rights along with the
defendant, no mutuality of waiver is generally required. See King & O’Neill, supra note 3, at
255–56 (reporting that both the defendant and the government waive appeal in only 12.5%
of appellate waiver cases). But see United States v. Guevara, 941 F.2d 1299, 1299–1300 (4th
Cir. 1991) (interpreting a defendant’s appellate waiver to implicitly bar the government from
appealing).
Scholars have criticized non-mutual appellate waivers. See D. Randall Johnson, Giving Trial
Judges the Final Word: Waiving the Right to Appeal Sentences Imposed Under the Sentencing Reform
Act, 71 NEB. L. REV. 694, 723–24 (1992) (advocating that appellate waivers should be explic-
itly mutual to be enforceable). A significant drawback of requiring mutuality of appellate
waivers is that it forces the defendant to accept the government’s appellate waiver as part (or
all) of the consideration received in exchange for the defendant’s appellate waiver. The de-
fendant may value some other concession by the government more highly, and imposing a
mutuality requirement on appellate waivers would diminish the value of a defendant’s right
to appeal as a bargaining chip.
44. See, e.g., Teeter, 257 F.3d at 22 (“Since the Supreme Court repeatedly has ruled that a
defendant may waive constitutional rights as part of a plea agreement, it follows logically that
a defendant ought to be able to waive rights that are purely creatures of statute.”) (internal
citation omitted); United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 567 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding that
because a defendant may waive constitutional rights in a plea bargains, “[i]t follows that a
defendant may also waive statutory rights, including the right to appeal.”); United States v.
Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 53 (4th Cir. 1990) (“[I]f defendants can waive fundamental constitu-
tional rights such as the right to counsel, or the right to a jury trial, surely they are not
precluded from waiving procedural rights granted by statute.”) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
45. See Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 400 & n.9 (1957) (providing a historical
account of the right to appeal in federal criminal cases).
46. See Johnson, supra note 43, at 695 n.1.
47. Melancon, 972 F.2d at 570 (Parker, J., concurring) (deriding this “faulty syllogism”);
United States v. Perez, 46 F. Supp. 2d 59, 65–67 (D. Mass. 1999) (“[S]ince not all rights are
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statutory rights must be knowing and voluntary, cannot violate pub-
lic policy, and must comply with due process. The federal appellate
courts have rejected challenges to appellate waivers on all three of
these grounds. These challenges, as well as the accepted rebuttals
to these challenges, are set forth below.
A. Knowing and Voluntary Waiver
The federal appellate courts have held that criminal defendants
can knowingly and voluntarily waive their prospective sentencing
appellate rights.48 In the wake of these rulings, modern defendants
are left to argue on a case-by-case basis that their individual appel-
late waivers were uninformed or coerced.
1. Per Se Challenges to Knowledge and Voluntariness
Some courts and commentators have maintained that a waiver of
a defendant’s right to appeal her sentence is inherently unin-
formed because the sentence has yet to be imposed or calculated.49
A central part of this argument is that a knowing waiver must be
waivable, the syllogism falls short in failing to distinguish, in some principled and contextu-
ally sensitive way, between those waivers which are acceptable, and those which are not.”); see
also Johnson, supra note 43, at 706 (noting, in due process analysis, that the statutory nature
of the right to appeal “has, at most, marginal relevance to whether or not a per se rule of
involuntariness is justified with respect to waiver of that right.”); Gregory M. Dyer & Brendan
Judge, Note, Criminal Defendants’ Waiver of the Right to Appeal—An Unacceptable Condition of a
Negotiated Sentence or Plea Bargain, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649, 661–63 (1990).
Some individual rights are inherently unwaivable despite their non-constitutional prove-
nance. See, e.g., United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 742 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(suggesting that a defendant is unable to waive the operation of the federal rule provision
that disallows the presence of alternate jurors in the jury room during deliberations); United
States v. Greatwalker, 285 F.3d 727, 730 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that parties cannot waive
statutory limits on sentencing “[e]ven when a defendant, prosecutor, and court agree”).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1325 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per
curiam); United States v. Woolley, 123 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 1997); Melancon, 972 F.2d at
567; see also Ginger K. Gooch, Note, The Message to Criminal Defendants—Waive at Your Own
Risk: The Eighth Circuit Enforces Waivers of Appellate Rights, 64 MO. L. REV. 459, 464 & n.37
(1999).
49. United States v. Raynor, 989 F. Supp. 43, 44 (D.D.C. 1997) (“Such a waiver is by
definition uninformed and unintelligent and cannot be voluntary and knowing.”); United
States v. Johnson, 992 F. Supp. 437, 439 (D.D.C. 1997); Melancon, 972 F.2d at 571 (Parker, J.,
concurring); Calhoun, supra note 3, at 205 (“There is simply no way the accused can be
viewed as knowing what he is giving up as a part of his waiver because it has not been deter-
mined at the time the plea is entered . . . waivers of this sort simply cannot withstand
scrutiny.”); Lynn Fant & Ronit Walker, Reflections on a Hobson’s Choice: Appellate Waivers and
Sentencing Guidelines, 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 60, 61 (1998).
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grounded in a high level of outcome certainty. For example, a de-
fendant who pleads guilty and waives her right to a jury trial is
certain that she will be convicted of a particular count.50 A defen-
dant entering into a sentencing appellate waiver is situated
differently: “she is freed of none of the uncertainties that surround
the sentencing process in exchange for giving up the right to later
challenge a possibly erroneous application or interpretation of the
Sentencing Guidelines or a sentencing statute.”51
As a proposed remedy, commentators have suggested that courts
should only regard sentencing appellate waivers as “knowing” when
the defendant’s guilty plea is conditioned on the imposition of a
specific sentence and when the defendant actually receives that sen-
tence.52 Under the federal rules, “C” pleas permit the parties to
submit a plea agreement to the district court with a binding sen-
tencing recommendation that requires the court either to accept
the agreement along with the sentencing recommendation or to
refuse it completely.53 According to some appellate waiver critics,
precise foreknowledge of the impending sentence negates the oth-
erwise unknowing nature of the sentencing appellate waiver.54
Others have suggested that binding a district court to an exact sen-
tence is not necessary, but rather that defendant’s appellate waiver
50. See Melancon, 972 F.2d at 572 (Parker, J., concurring) (“While one cannot fully know
the consequences of confessing or pleading guilty, one does know what is being yielded up at
the time he or she yields it.”).
51. Raynor, 989 F. Supp. at 44; see also Melancon, 972 F.2d at 572 (Parker, J., concurring)
(“This right [to appeal sentencing error] cannot come into existence until after the judge pronounces
sentence; it is only then that the defendant knows what errors the district court has made—i.e.,
what errors exist to be appealed, or waived.”).
52. Raynor, 989 F. Supp. at 47–48; Jesse Davis, Note, Texas Law Rides to the Rescue: A Lone
Star Solution for Dubious Federal Presentence Appeal Waivers, 63 BAYLOR L. REV. 250, 267 (2011);
Calhoun, supra note 3, at 206 (“When the defendant gets precisely what is bargained for it
offends our basic notions of fairness to allow that same defendant to try to improve upon the
deal by means of an appeal.”); Comment, Second Circuit Upholds Plea Provision that Waives
Appeal Without Fixed Sentence Range, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1116, 1119 (1998); David E. Carney,
Note, Waiver of the Right to Appeal Sentencing in Plea Agreements with the Federal Government, 40
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1019, 1044–45 (1999).
53. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C). These so-called “C” pleas are discussed more in depth
at text accompanying note 10, supra. Empirical research has shown that plea agreements
containing appellate waiver provisions are more likely to limit the court’s sentencing options
in some way. See King & O’Neill, supra note 3, at 239–42; see also id. at 251 n.135 (describing
one federal public defender’s policy of only entering into a plea agreement containing an
appellate waiver provision if it was a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea).
54. See, e.g., Raynor, 989 F. Supp. at 47–48; Davis, supra note 52, at 267; Carney, supra
note 52, at 1044–45.
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is sufficiently knowing as long as the defendant is permitted to ap-
peal a sentence outside of some predetermined range, such as a
maximum cap on the term of incarceration.55
Courts have rejected this argument, holding that a defendant
can knowingly waive her right to appeal her sentence despite the
fact that the sentencing hearing has not yet occurred.56 Although a
defendant is ignorant of the outcome of the sentencing hearing at
the time of the waiver, she is aware of the nature of the right she is
waiving.57 The waiver inquiry focuses on the defendant’s under-
standing of the appellate right that she is waiving, not her
knowledge of the sentencing proceeding’s outcome.58 Thus, courts
enforce sentencing appellate waivers as long as the defendant un-
derstands the nature of the waiver.59
55. For example, Judge Charles Roberts Breyer has proposed limiting appellate waivers
in scope to permit the defendant to appeal a sentence above a specified upper limit. United
States v. Soon Dong Han, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1044–45 (N.D. Cal. 2002). It is unclear how
limited of a ceiling is necessary to satisfy this recommendation because appellate waivers are
already not enforceable against claims that the punishment exceeded the statutory maxi-
mum. See supra note 33. For one commentator’s view, see Calhoun, supra note 3, at 209–11.
Even assuming that commentators could agree upon a precise enough ceiling on a defen-
dant’s imprisonment to render the appellate waiver knowing with respect to the term of
incarceration, it remains unclear whether similar issues of lack of knowledge would arise with
respect to the noncustodial portion of the sentence, such as the terms of the defendant’s
supervised release.
56. See United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1326–27 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per
curiam); United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 21–23 (1st Cir. 2001); Melancon, 972 F.2d at
567–68; United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 320 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Calhoun,
supra note 3, at 202 n.461 (listing cases).
57. See Haines, Jr., supra note 5, at 229 (comparing the waiver of the right to appeal a
future sentence to the decision to plead guilty under the previously indeterminate sentenc-
ing regime); see also United States v. Guillen, 561 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“An
anticipatory waiver—that is, one made before the defendant knows what the sentence will
be—is nonetheless a knowing waiver if the defendant is aware of and understands the risks
involved in his decision.”); United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Waiv-
ers of the legal consequences of unknown future events are commonplace.”); Melancon, 972
F.2d at 567–68; United States v. Rutan, 956 F.2d 827, 830 (8th Cir. 1992); Navarro-Botello, 912
F.2d at 320.
58. The choice to plead guilty always involves a calculated risk; appellate waivers are but
one dimension of this calculation:
By signing a waiver, defendants gamble that the deals they have negotiated are better
than the dispositions they might ultimately receive if they preserved their right to
review. Some win this bet, others do not. . . . We simply do not know what proportion
of defendants end up worse off because of their waivers.
King & O’Neill, supra note 3, at 250.
59. A 1999 amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that required dis-
trict courts to discuss any applicable appellate waiver with the defendant during the plea
colloquy bolstered this interpretation. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(N). Although the rules
advisory committee explicitly stated that it took “no position on the underlying validity” of
appellate waivers, FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s notes (referring to the 1999
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Others argue that appellate waivers are inherently involuntary or
coercive because of the unequal balance of power between the gov-
ernment and the defendant in a criminal prosecution.60 Rather
than viewing appellate waivers as additional bargaining chips in the
defendant’s arsenal,61 these commentators complain that the gov-
ernment extracts appellate waivers as the proverbial ante to
participate in plea negotiations and that it offers no consideration
in exchange for the waivers.62 Some have gone so far as to label
appellate waivers “one-sided contract[s] of adhesion.”63
The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected arguments based on
the coerciveness of the plea-bargaining process.64 Because defend-
ants have no right to a plea agreement, the government is free to
Amendments), the rule amendment solidified appellate waivers as an established component
of plea agreements and plea colloquies.
60. See Calhoun, supra note 3, at 153–59 (calling for a reevaluation of the constitutional-
ity of plea agreements in general and of the Supreme Court’s “central assumption that the
defendant and the prosecutor are coequal adversaries in the plea bargaining context” in
particular).
Notably, as a basis for revisiting the fairness of the plea-bargaining process, Professor Cal-
houn identifies the sharply increased penalty ranges the federal determinate sentencing
system created and the concomitant increase in the power of the government in defining the
sentence at the charging stage. Id. at 154–56, 158; see also United States v. Raynor, 989 F.
Supp. 43, 45 (D.D.C. 1997); United States v. Johnson, 992 F. Supp. 437, 439–40 (D.D.C.
1997) (calling the government’s bargaining power “utterly superior” to that of criminal de-
fendants “because the precise charge or charges to be brought—and thus the ultimate
sentence to be imposed under the guidelines scheme—is up to the prosecution.”). Others
have likewise argued that the sentencing reforms of the 1980s, including mandatory sentenc-
ing guidelines, increased the power of the government at the expense of defendants’ ability
to voluntarily decline to plea bargain. See Fant & Walker, supra note 49, at 61. However, since
then, that pressure has abated, at least somewhat, because the Guidelines were downgraded
from mandatory to advisory status. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
61. Some courts view enforcing appellate waivers as adding to the reserve of “goods”
that a willing defendant may use to entice the government to enter into a favorable plea
bargain. See, e.g., Guillen, 561 F.3d at 530; Teeter, 257 F.3d at 22; United States v. Yemitan, 70
F.3d 746, 748 (2d Cir. 1995); see also notes 89–90, infra.
62. See Steven L. Chanenson, Guidance from Above and Beyond, 58 STAN. L. REV. 175, 182
(2005) (“[T]here is reason to question how much real trading occurs.”); Fant & Walker,
supra note 49, at 60 (“[M]any United States Attorney’s Offices require defendants to waive
the right to appeal as part of a plea agreement.”); Calhoun, supra note 3, at 167 (“[A]ppeal
waivers look . . . more like the price of admission to engage in the plea bargaining process at
all.”).
63. Raynor, 989 F. Supp. at 49; see also Johnson, 992 F. Supp. at 439.
64. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (finding a guilty plea to be
voluntary even though it was calculated to minimize the likelihood of receiving the death
penalty); see also Johnson, supra note 43, at 707 (“There simply is no reason to believe the
Court is inclined to revisit the issue anytime soon.”); Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508
(1984) (stating that plea bargains are “no less voluntary than any other bargained-for ex-
change” despite the defendant’s interest in minimizing punishment); Calhoun, supra note 3,
at 152 (identifying the “core assumption” in the Supreme Court’s plea-bargaining jurispru-
dence as “a negotiating process characterized by arms-length transactions between parties
who enjoy ‘relatively equal bargaining power.’ ”) (internal citation omitted).
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make a plea agreement contingent on an appellate waiver.65 Moreo-
ver, empirical research has shown that, on the whole, plea
agreements that contain appellate waiver agreements confer some
extra benefits on the defendant when compared to plea agree-
ments in which the defendant does not waive the right to appeal.66
Although the decision to waive the right to appeal future unknown
errors is understandably a difficult one for defendants, courts have
found that it does not rise to the level of coerciveness necessary to
overcome a defendant’s will and overbear her volition.67 Thus, per
se challenges to the enforceability of sentencing appellate waivers
are unlikely to gain much traction in the federal courts.
2. Case-by-Case Analysis of Knowledge and Voluntariness
Finding nothing inherently unknowable or involuntary in the ap-
pellate waiver process, federal courts test the knowing and
voluntary nature of individual appellate waivers on a case-by-case
basis. The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that she
did not knowingly and voluntarily waive her appellate rights.68 A
district court’s adherence or non-adherence to the federal rule re-
quiring the discussion of appellate waiver provisions during the
65. Although criminal defendants and the government often see utility in plea agree-
ments, neither is obligated to bargain. Indeed, “a common response” of criminal defendants
to the introduction of appellate waiver agreements was an “open plea”—a guilty plea without
the benefit of any agreement with the government. King & O’Neill, supra note 3, at 233 n.87;
see also id. at 250 n.133 (recounting one federal prosecutor’s view that the overall plea agree-
ment inures to the benefit of  the defendant in the end and “that’s why they sign the
agreement at all.”).
66. King & O’Neill, supra note 3, at 232–38 (2005). Appreciable differences were ob-
served in the rate of downward departures and the application of the safety valve in plea
agreements containing appellate waivers versus those that did not. Id. at 236–38.
More than one of every five waiver cases received a downward departure other than
substantial assistance, compared to one of every ten nonwaiver cases in our sample [of
971 cases]. And nearly one in five waiver cases received a safety valve adjustment, com-
pared to less than one in eight nonwaiver cases.
Id. at 238. But see id. at 244–45 (noting that defendants in some districts do not appear to
receive independent consideration in exchange for appellate waivers).
67. See United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 320–21 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Just
because the choice looks different to [the defendant] with the benefit of hindsight, does not
make the choice involuntary.”); see also Haines, Jr., supra note 5, at 229 (finding the decision
to accept a waiver to be “no more the product of ‘coercion’ than the standard plea bargain.”)
(internal citation omitted).
68. See United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1329 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per
curiam).
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plea colloquy69 does not conclusively demonstrate whether the de-
fendant knowingly entered into the appellate waiver. A district
court’s proper questioning of the defendant during the plea collo-
quy only creates a presumption that the appellate waiver was
knowing and voluntary; a defendant could demonstrate otherwise
by introducing other particularized evidence.70 Conversely, even if
the district court failed to mention the appellate waiver during the
plea colloquy, courts of appeals will enforce the appellate waiver as
long as other indicia demonstrate that the defendant understood
the waiver and freely assented to it.71
Relatedly, a district court’s instruction at the conclusion of the
sentencing hearing that the defendant has fourteen days to note an
appeal does not render an appellate waiver unenforceable. Such a
statement is undeniably true—some issues, including all issues
outside of the scope of the appellate waiver, remain appealable de-
spite the presence of an appellate waiver.72 Moreover, such a
belated statement made weeks after the acceptance of the plea has
no effect on whether the defendant knew and understood the ap-
pellate waiver at the time of the agreement.73
When individual defendants successfully demonstrate that they
did not understand the appellate waiver provision to which they
agreed, courts naturally decline to enforce the waivers. Still, appel-
late courts have not taken a uniform approach to dealing with
uninformed or involuntary appellate waivers. While some courts in-
validate the entire plea agreement and send the parties back to
69. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(N).
70. See United States v. White, 366 F.3d 291, 295–96 (4th Cir. 2004) (although a defen-
dant’s statements during a Rule 11 colloquy “ ‘carry a strong presumption of verity,’ ” they
are not categorically immune from later challenge (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S.
63, 74 (1977))).
71. See United States v. Loutos, 383 F.3d 615, 619 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that defen-
dant, who was an attorney, made a knowing waiver of his right to appeal despite failure of the
district court to mention it in the plea colloquy); United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 24 (1st
Cir. 2001).
72. See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., United States v. Azure, 571 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Fisher, 232 F.3d 301, 304–05 (2d Cir. 2000) (“If enforceable when entered, the waiver does
not lose its effectiveness because the district judge gives the defendant post-sentence advice
inconsistent with the waiver. No justifiable reliance has been placed on such advice.”) (inter-
nal footnote omitted). But see United States v. Felix, 561 F.3d 1036, 1040–41 (9th Cir. 2009)
(holding that the district court’s advisement of the right to appeal during sentencing hearing
can limit the scope of an appellate waiver if the government does not object) (citing United
States v. Buchanan, 59 F.3d 914, 917–18 (9th Cir. 1995)).
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square one,74 other courts simply sever the appellate waiver from
the plea agreement and forge ahead with the merits of the appeal.75
B. Public Policy Considerations
Numerous public policy considerations exist both for and against
sentencing appellate waivers. In general terms, the policy rationales
in favor of appellate waivers are finality, efficiency, and freedom of
bargaining. Critics of appellate waivers generally point to the poten-
tial for uncorrected sentencing errors and negative impacts on the
perceived integrity of the criminal justice system. As of now, the
federal appellate courts have not found that the negative policy
consequences of sentencing appellate waivers merit their
invalidation.
1. Finality and Efficiency
Some courts and commentators claim that enforcing sentencing
appellate waivers furthers the related public policies of finality and
efficiency.76 Sentencing appellate waivers promote the finality of
sentences in the sense that a valid appellate waiver makes it almost
impossible to disturb these judgments. By increasing finality and
curtailing the appellate process, appellate waivers reduce the wor-
kload of the appellate courts, prosecutors, and state-funded defense
attorneys.77 This reduced workload permits reallocation of govern-
mental and judicial resources to other areas, such as additional
prosecutions. These additional prosecutions reduce crime, pro-
mote justice, and generally benefit the public.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Ogden, 102 F.3d 887, 888 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Wenger, 58 F.3d 280, 282 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Waivers of appeal must stand or fall with the
agreements of which they are a part.”). But see Bennardo, supra note 5, at 541 (noting incon-
sistency in Seventh Circuit jurisprudence on this issue).
75. See, e.g., Teeter, 257 F.3d at 27 (“[T]he proper remedy, given the circumstances, is to
sever the waiver of appellate rights from the remainder of the plea agreement, allowing the
other provisions to remain in force.”); United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1353 (11th
Cir. 1993) (“By imposing the severance remedy, [the defendant] will get the benefit of the
deal he thought he struck.”).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 322 (9th Cir. 1990) (describ-
ing finality as “perhaps the most important” benefit of plea bargaining); see also Teeter, 257
F.3d at 22 & n.5; Calhoun, supra note 3, at 137–38.
77. See Teeter, 257 F.3d at 22; Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 322; Goodwin, supra note 2, at
212 (noting that appellate waiver supporters “contend that waivers help to decrease the enor-
mous amount of guideline sentencing litigation”); Haines, Jr., supra note 5, at 229 (“If
waivers of appeal were forbidden, courts would continue to bear the burden of many margi-
nal appeals that hinder and devalue the appellate process.”).
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Not all commentators believe this brand of finality is positive.78
Although appellate waivers bolster the finality of judgments, that
finality comes at the expense of the error-correcting function of the
appellate process.79 Finality of erroneous judgments and sentences
is a negative. Moreover, some have questioned whether appellate
waivers actually conserve significant resources given the costs of
enforcement.80
When a defendant requests an appeal despite a valid appellate
waiver, defense counsel often files an Anders brief.81 In an Anders
brief, defense counsel references “anything in the record that
might arguably support the appeal,” but states that the attorney
could not find any non-frivolous issues for appeal.82 The defendant
is then permitted to file a supplemental brief raising additional
grounds for appeal or expounding upon the arguments raised in
the Anders brief.83 When deciding an Anders appeal, the appellate
court is duty-bound to independently review the entire trial record
to determine whether the appeal is “wholly frivolous.”84 If a valid
appellate waiver is present in an Anders appeal, the appellate court
may dismiss the issues the appellate waiver covers, but the court
must still independently review the trial record to ascertain whether
the defendant possesses any non-frivolous appellate arguments that
are unwaivable or fall outside of the scope of the waiver.85 Thus, the
78. See Chanenson, supra note 62, at 183 (“[J]udicial resource questions should largely
be beside the point.”); see also United States v. Vanderwerff, No. 12-cr-00069, 2012 WL
2514933, at *4 (D. Colo. June 28, 2012) (“Prioritizing efficiency at the expense of the individ-
ual exercise of constitutional rights applies to the guilty and the innocent alike, and
sacrificing constitutional rights on the altar of efficiency is of dubious legality.”).
79. See Johnson, supra note 43, at 710 (“While the wholesale enforcement of appeal-of-
sentence waivers would achieve sentence finality, it would do so only at unwarranted expense
to sentencing accuracy.”).
80. See United States v. Perez, 46 F. Supp. 2d 59, 71 (D. Mass. 1999) (“[I]t is not at all
clear that there is a tide of appeals from pleas that needs to be stemmed.”); United States v.
Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 579 (5th Cir. 1992) (Parker, J., concurring) (predicting that it is
“wishful thinking at best and self-delusion at least” to think that appellate waivers will stem
the tide of sentencing appeals); see also Johnson, supra note 43, at 711 (estimating that the
“processing of sentence appeals is generally less costly than the processing of other types of
appeals” and cautioning that the burden imposed by processing frivolous sentencing appeals
“should not be overstated”).
81. Also called a “no-merit” brief, the Anders brief takes its name from Anders v. Califor-
nia, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
82. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., United States v. Widdows, 477 F. App’x 143 (4th Cir. 2012) (per curiam)
(dismissing majority of Anders appeal as precluded by appellate waiver but reviewing record
and affirming as to unwaivable issues).
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enforcement of a valid appellate waiver often consumes a consider-
able amount of appellate resources, especially where Anders appeals
are involved.86
2. Freedom of Bargaining
Public policy favors permitting the government and the defen-
dant to each enter into an enforceable bargain that they believe will
further their self-interest.87 Diffuse public interests should rarely
outweigh a criminal defendant’s freedom to bargain in the way that
she believes best protects her liberty interests.88 Any restriction on
the enforceability of appellate waivers reduces the number of bar-
gaining chips available to criminal defendants,89 undermines their
ability to safeguard their own interests, and ultimately makes suc-
cessful bargaining less likely.90
An individual may always waive or forfeit appeal simply by declin-
ing to file a notice of appeal,91 voluntarily dismissing an appeal
86. Cf. King & O’Neill, supra note 3, at 227 (finding a probable connection between the
proliferation of appellate waivers and a decline in the rate of appellate filings). But see id. at
228 & n.78 (noting other factors likely contributed to the decline).
87. Johnson, supra note 43, at 712.
88. Cf. Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 395 (1987) (enforcing an agreement
releasing the right to file a civil action against the town in exchange for the dismissal of
criminal charges). But see United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 555–56 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding
that waivers of appellate rights implicate “institutional and societal values” that transcend
individuals’ bargaining interests).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 895 (8th Cir. 2003) (Arnold, J., concur-
ring) (“One of the few things that a criminal defendant has to trade with his or her accuser is
the right to appeal, and so the court, far from improving the lot of criminal defendants with
its interventionist rule, actually deprives them of their property and the wherewithal with
which to bargain.”); United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 562 (3d Cir. 2001); United States
v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1051 (7th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Mezzanatto, 513
U.S. 196, 208 (1995) (“A defendant can ‘maximize’ what he has to ‘sell’ only if he is permit-
ted to offer what the prosecutor is most interested in buying.”); Calhoun, supra note 3, at 138.
90. See United States v. Guillen, 561 F.3d 527, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Andis, 333 F.3d at
895 (Arnold, J., concurring); United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 22 (1st Cir. 2001); Teeter,
supra note 35, at 749; see also Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 209 (noting that limitations on what may
be plea bargained may have the effect of curtailing plea bargaining); Calhoun, supra note 3,
at 138.
91. See United States v. Wenger, 58 F.3d 280, 282 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Our legal system
makes no appeal the default position.”); see also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444
(1944) (noting that “a constitutional right may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by
the failure to make timely assertion of the right.”).
WINTER 2015] Post-Sentencing Appellate Waivers 365
once filed,92 dying,93 going on the lam,94 or failing to call the trial
court’s attention to the alleged error.95 A necessary ingredient in
the appellate process is a willing and diligent defendant. If an indi-
vidual defendant decides not to file a timely appeal and freely
waives her appellate rights, it is counterintuitive that society would
bar the defendant from extracting a price for that same waiver.
3. Sentencing Disparity
A major goal of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA) was to
reduce the imposition of dissimilar sentences on similarly-situated
defendants.96 Reformers saw incongruent sentences based on indi-
vidual judges’ preferences as a major problem of the pre-SRA era.97
To reduce sentencing disparity, the SRA created federal sentencing
guidelines, which were initially mandatory but were later down-
graded to advisory,98 and meaningful appellate review of
sentences.99 Numerous courts and commentators have argued that
the enforcement of sentencing appellate waivers undermines the
SRA’s goal of consistency by allowing erroneous sentences to go un-
corrected and inhibiting the articulation of a common law of
sentencing.100
92. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 838 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1988) (appellant’s voluntary
dismissal of appeal surrendered all future claims that could have been raised on appeal).
93. The death of an appealing criminal defendant typically results in either dismissal of
the appeal or setting aside the conviction. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J.
KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 27.5(a) (2d ed. 1999).
94. Under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, “an appellate court may dismiss the ap-
peal of a defendant who is a fugitive from justice during the pendency of his appeal.” Ortega-
Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 239 (1993); see also LAFAVE, ISRAEL & KING, supra
note 93, § 27.5(c); Martha B. Stolley, Note, Sword or Shield: Due Process and the Fugitive Disenti-
tlement Doctrine, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 751 (1997).
95. LAFAVE, ISRAEL & KING, supra note 93, § 27.5(c). But see id. at § 27.5(d) (discussing
appellate courts’ authority “to reverse on the basis of plain error even though the error was
not properly raised and preserved at the trial level”).
96. See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4–5, 7 (1988); KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF
JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 51 (1998) (identifying the primary
objective of the SRA as the elimination of “unwarranted disparity” in federal sentencing)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
97. See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5 (1973)
(“As to the penalty that may be imposed, our laws characteristically leave to the sentencing
judge a range of choice that should be unthinkable in a ‘government of laws, not of men.’ ”).
98. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005); see also STITH & CABRANES,
supra note 96, at 38–77 (chronicling the advent of the U.S. Sentencing Commission and the
promulgation of the Guidelines); Breyer, supra note 96, at 5–8.
99. 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2012).
100. In the words of Judge Paul L. Friedman:
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By making sentences virtually unreviewable, the widespread use
of enforceable sentencing appellate waivers results in a functional
return to the pre-SRA system.101 The appellate system exists “to cor-
rect errors; to develop legal principles; and to tie geographically
dispersed lower courts into a unified, authoritative legal system.”102
Once a broad appellate waiver is executed, a sentencing court can
impose virtually any sentence within the statutory limits without the
fear of appellate intermeddling. Circumventing appellate review in-
creases the risk that district courts will break with national trends in
sentencing, ignore the recommendations of the Guidelines, and
impose sentences that are out of alignment with other sentences in
comparable prosecutions. Without the specter of an appellate court
vacating the sentence as unreasonable, the district court commands
almost free rein over the sentence.103 Such lack of oversight results
in a greater likelihood of idiosyncratic sentences.104
Absence of appellate review also results in a dearth of preceden-
tial case law.105 Thus, district courts that seek to impose within-
Guidelines sentences or otherwise follow the dictates of the sen-
tencing statutes have fewer common law guideposts to follow. With
fewer guideposts, well-meaning district courts are more likely to in-
advertently deviate from acceptable sentencing practices and
outcomes. Coupled with the potential inability of the appellate
court to correct an error because of an appellate waiver, the lack of
What the government seeks to do through the appeal waiver provision is inconsistent
with the goals and intent of Congress and the goals and intent of the Sentencing
Commission. It will insulate from appellate review erroneous factual findings, inter-
pretations and applications of the Guidelines by trial judges and thus, ultimately, it
will undermine uniformity.
United States v. Raynor, 989 F. Supp. 43, 48 (D.D.C. 1997); see also United States v. Melancon,
972 F.2d 566, 574 (5th Cir. 1992) (Parker, J., concurring); United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d
478, 483 (9th Cir. 1991) (Nelson, J., dissenting); United States v. Johnson, 992 F. Supp. 437,
439 (D.D.C. 1997); Douglas A. Berman, The fate and future of appeal waivers?, SENTENCING LAW
AND POLICY BLOG (Mar. 4, 2005, 12:05 PM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law
_and_policy/2005/03/the_fate_and_fu.hml; Goodwin, supra note 2, at 212; Calhoun, supra
note 3, at 201, 206; Chanenson, supra note 62, at 182–84; Comment, supra note 52, at 1120.
101. See United States v. Perez, 46 F. Supp. 2d 59, 68 (D. Mass. 1999); see Melancon, 972
F.2d at 574 (Parker, J., concurring).
102. Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 62,
69 (1985).
103. See United States v. Vanderwerff, No. 12-cr-00069, 2012 WL 2514933, at *5 (D. Colo.
June 28, 2012).
104. But see Johnson, supra note 43, at 718 (arguing that appellate “intermeddling” can
create sentencing irrationality and disparity).
105. See Perez, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 68 (“[A]llowing appeals waivers would have a cost in terms
of the development of appellate law necessary to clarify how the guidelines should be ap-
plied.”); Dyer & Judge, supra note 47, at 663; Comment, supra note 52, at 1121; Chanenson,
supra note 62, at 183; see also Johnson, supra note 43, at 712.
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appellate sentencing case law compounds the likelihood of non-
uniform sentences.
Appellate waiver supporters argue that developing the common
law is not an established public policy, but rather “seems directly in
conflict with doctrines of judicial restraint that suggest that courts
should avoid crafting public policy unless forced to do so.”106
Others have noted that adequate sentencing common law is devel-
oped through the significant number of cases without appellate
waivers, including all of the prosecutions that go to trial.107 Addi-
tionally, the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s constant oversight of
the Guidelines diminishes the need for judicial review of all
sentences.108 Empirical research demonstrates that an early concern
that the widespread use of non-mutual appellate waivers would lead
to a disproportionate number of government-initiated sentencing
appeals109 has not come to fruition because defendants continue to
initiate a significant number of sentencing appeals.110 Additionally,
as noted above, defendants have always possessed the ability to
forgo appeal, which similarly compromises society’s interests in er-
ror correction and the reduction of disparate sentences.111
4. Integrity of the Criminal Justice System
Judges and commentators have voiced concerns that prosecu-
tors, defense attorneys, and district court judges are self-interested
in obtaining a defendant’s appellate waiver because the waiver insu-
lates their actions from later review.112 When it comes to judges,
some worry that this insulation erodes judicial integrity.113 When it
comes to defense attorneys, some claim that the lawyer’s personal
interest in the execution of an appellate or collateral attack waiver
rises to the level of a conflict of interest that compromises the attor-
ney’s ability to competently represent the defendant.114
106. Teeter, supra note 35, at 741 & n.97.
107. Haines, Jr., supra note 5, at 229.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Perez, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 69 (voicing concern that widespread use of appellate
waivers would lead to “skewed case law” based on the disproportionate number of appeals by
the government); United States v. Raynor, 989 F. Supp. 43, 46 (D.D.C. 1997).
110. See King & O’Neill, supra note 3, at 256.
111. See supra Part II.B.2.
112. See Calhoun, supra note 3, at 138–39 & nn.58–59 (listing cases); King & O’Neill,
supra note 3, at 223 (citing letter from National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers).
113. See Dyer & Judge, supra note 47, at 663–65.
114. King & O’Neill, supra note 3, at 245–47 (labeling appellate waiver provisions “an
obvious conflict of interest”).
368 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 48:2
These concerns certainly have some validity. An aversion to rever-
sal or a desire to reduce the likelihood of continued proceedings
after remand may motivate a judge to accept a plea agreement con-
taining an appellate waiver. Concern over questionable practices in
the prosecution may motivate a prosecutor to offer a plea bargain
at a significant discount as long as the defendant agrees to an appel-
late waiver. Finally, a desire to avoid a later charge of ineffective
assistance of counsel may motivate a defense attorney to counsel
her client to accept a plea agreement containing appellate and col-
lateral attack waivers. These concerns, however, have not rendered
appellate waivers unenforceable.
Despite an otherwise enforceable waiver, defendants may attack
the plea agreement or the waiver itself with a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel in acceptance of the plea agreement or the
waiver.115 In most circuits, however, a defendant who has waived
appeal and collateral review may not raise any ineffective assistance
claims based on her attorney’s actions after the execution of the
waiver (such as during sentencing).116 Some commentators take sol-
ace in the plea colloquy to ensure that defendants enter into such
waivers knowingly and with an opportunity to discuss the waiver
provision with both the court and counsel.117 With full knowledge
of the ramifications of their waivers, defendants ostensibly agree to
waive their rights to challenge errors and ineffectiveness only when
the plea agreement makes it worthwhile to do so. Thus, federal
courts continue to enforce sentencing appellate waivers despite
concerns of abuse by the bench and the bar.
C. An Impermissible Chill and Unconstitutional Condition
Constitutional due process prohibits a court from putting a price
on a defendant’s right to appeal or otherwise chilling it.118 The
Constitution does not require an avenue for criminal appeals;119
115. See id. at 247 n.122; see also supra text accompanying note 40.
116. See, e.g., Nunez v. United States, 495 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 2007), vacated 554 U.S.
911 (2008) (“[I]neffective assistance after the plea . . . cannot retroactively make the plea
invalid.”). But see United States v. Attar, 38 F.3d 727, 732–33 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that
appellate waiver did not preclude challenge that the sentencing hearing and presentation of
motion to withdraw plea were conducted in violation of the Sixth Amendment where the
district court permitted the defense attorney to withdraw at the beginning of the sentencing
hearing and defendant proceeded pro se). See also supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
117. Teeter, supra note 35, at 741.
118. See, e.g., Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 24 n.11 (1973); North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724 (1969); see also Calhoun, supra note 3, at 146; Dyer & Judge, supra
note 47, at 655.
119. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).
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“[o]nce a system of appellate courts is put into place, however, a
criminal defendant’s ability to appeal may not be unduly bur-
dened.”120 Demonstrating a sufficient chill, nevertheless, presents a
significant hurdle for criminal defendants. The Supreme Court has
declined to find that offers of benefits by the government, up to
and including avoiding the death penalty, impermissibly chilled
other rights.121 Offers to drop charges or otherwise minimize a de-
fendant’s punishment in exchange for the waiver of a defendant’s
appellate rights do not impermissibly chill the exercise of those
rights any more than the same sorts of offers in a greater plea
agreement chill a defendant’s exercise of her right to a jury trial.122
Thus, courts have roundly rejected the impermissible chill argu-
ment when raised against plea bargaining in general123 and against
appellate waivers specifically.124 An individual defendant would
have an easier time showing that her particular circumstance was so
devoid of options that the government’s offer rendered her appel-
late waiver involuntary.125 Thus, arguments involving the
impermissible chilling effects of appellate waivers are rarely raised
and unlikely to succeed.
III. AN INCENTIVE AND EFFICIENCY-BASED CRITIQUE
OF SENTENCING APPELLATE WAIVERS
The current plea agreement sentencing appellate waiver system
suffers from three major drawbacks because these waivers (1) re-
move much of the incentive for district courts to adhere to
established procedural and substantive sentencing law, (2) create
120. United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 555 (2d Cir. 1996); see also United States v.
Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 577 (5th Cir. 1992) (Parker, J., concurring) (“Even if the Due Pro-
cess and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution do not require the government to
create a statutory system of appellate rights, these constitutional clauses do require the gov-
ernment, once it has decided voluntarily to create such a system (as it has), to allow
unfettered and equal access to it.”) (citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)).
121. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (“[A] plea of guilty is not invalid
merely because entered to avoid the possibility of a death penalty”).
122. See Teeter, supra note 35, at 740; see also Calhoun, supra note 3, at 153.
123. See Calhoun, supra note 3, at 153.
124. See United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1990); Calhoun,
supra note 3, at 149 (concluding that the evolution of Supreme Court precedent no longer
supports invalidation of appellate waivers on this basis). But see United States v. Perez, 46 F.
Supp. 2d 59, 67–68 (D. Mass. 1999) (finding that appellate waivers are an undue burden on
the right to appeal in violation of due process); Dyer & Judge, supra note 47, at 655 (arguing
that appellate waivers create an unreasonable deterrent to a defendant’s exercise of her stat-
utory right to appeal in violation of due process).
125. See supra Part II.A.2.
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inefficiencies in the bargaining process, and (3) lack the “bite” nec-
essary to deter defendants from breaching the agreement. These
first two concerns are not wholly divorced from previous criticisms
already described. Removing incentives from the district courts is
an extension of the argument that sentencing appellate waivers un-
dermine the Sentencing Reform Act and the discussion of the
inefficiencies of the bargaining structure builds upon previous criti-
cisms that appellate waivers impair plea bargaining.
A. Hypothesizing Judicial Response to Appellate Waivers
Anecdotes abound of district court judges who appear to alter
their behavior at sentencing hearings based on the existence of an
appellate waiver.126 Some judges appear to give short shrift to ex-
plaining the basis of their sentences.127 Others perhaps arrive at
different sentencing outcomes. But anecdotes, however interesting,
prove little. This Article therefore employs existing models of judi-
cial behavior and the available data to support the hypothesis that
the absence of appellate review affects sentencing behavior. This
analysis assumes that district court judges are rational (although
not hyper-rational) actors,128 who seek to maximize utility. How-
ever, federal district court judges number in the hundreds129 with as
many individual definitions of utility. Some value being a “good”
judge, others prioritize avoiding reversal, others seek promotions,
and others maximize their leisure. No single formula can describe
all judges, but both behavioral models and empirical data support
the conclusion that the absence of appellate review affects the sen-
tencing behavior of the “ordinary” district court judge.
126. See, e.g., King & O’Neill, supra note 3, at 247–48 & n.123.
127. The transcript of one sentencing hearing abruptly ends after the district court judge
pronounces the sentence without any supporting explanation and confirms with the assistant
U.S. attorney that the plea agreement includes an appellate waiver. United States v. Powell,
No. 7:09-CR-114-1-BO (E.D.N.C. Feb. 25, 2010).
128. The fact that humans are not hyper-rational does not void rational-choice theory. See
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.4 (8th ed. 2011); see also Richard A.
Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1552–54
(1998).
129. In fiscal year 2013, there were 677 authorized judgeships in the federal district
courts. See United States Courts, U.S. District Courts (last visited Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.us
courts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013/us-district-courts.aspx.
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1. Dalton’s Trial Judges Archetypes
Nearly thirty years ago, Professor Harlon Dalton described three
archetypes of trial judges: bench warmers, bench climbers, and
bench builders.130 The bench warmer is a team player—she is un-
likely to take chances or stretch precedents, is “willing to pull her
weight, so long as others pull theirs,” and “is, if anything, a little too
appreciative” of her judicial position, as she did not actually expect
to obtain it.131 The bench climber seeks to advance through the
judicial ranks. To rise through the ranks, she seeks “to make few
mistakes while doing a few things really well.”132 Finally, in contrast,
the bench builder takes her position in the trial court very seriously
because that is where justice is achieved (if at all). She trusts her
own rulings, “does not regard precedent as particularly instructive,”
and “views appellate review as a necessary evil”—necessary to rectify
the mistakes of colleagues but a roadblock that she must sidestep to
achieve justice.133
Professor Dalton used these archetypes to argue that appeal as of
right is not necessary for a variety of civil cases. The bench warmer,
although not the most capable of judges, would never actively at-
tempt to disobey the teachings of the appellate court. She is
unlikely to employ the precedents creatively and will likely attempt
to insulate her decisions from reversal.134 The bench warmer,
though, would act no differently under a system that permitted ap-
peal as of right versus one that permitted discretionary appeals. Her
goal is to apply the precedents, move the cases, and avoid the hu-
miliation of reversal.
Similarly, the bench climber seeks to minimize reversal, second-
guessing, or negative treatment in the press.135 Unlike the bench
warmer, however, she may attempt to anticipate shifts in the higher
court’s thinking rather than just apply precedent. If she senses that
a precedent will be overruled, she may challenge the unpopular
precedent to demonstrate that she was out in front of the shift. To
attract the attention of the court above (which she would like to
join), she may craft especially well-written or “splash[y]”
opinions.136





135. See id. at 88.
136. See id.
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Appellate review has the greatest effect on the bench builder.137
Finding appellate review of her own work a nuisance, the bench
builder goes to great lengths to insulate her decisions from reversal.
She knows the just outcome and does not want her work undone by
the appellate court. Thus, she may hide the ball or otherwise distort
her true reasoning to avoid reversal and preserve what she views as
a just outcome.138
Dalton questioned whether the threat of appellate review actually
induces trial judges to self-correct and reach more just results.139
Reversals may not motivate some judges if the percentage of rever-
sals is small and, in those judges’ eyes, arbitrary. Appellate review
only motivates some judges to better insulate their opinions from
reversal, but not to alter their outcomes. Other judges are unmoved
by the prospect of reversal because they simply lack the aptitude to
accurately forecast how the appellate court would have them
rule.140
None of these three judicial archetypes would substantially alter
their modus operandi under a system that provides an appeal of
right versus a discretionary appeal. Appellate review is not guaran-
teed even in an appeal of right system, because the losing party may
simply elect not to appeal. Rather, it is the threat of appeal that
motivates trial judges to act the way they do, and a system of discre-
tionary appeals does not significantly dissipate that threat. The
question appellate waivers pose is what effect an assurance of no ap-
pellate review has on the cast of judicial archetypes. The bench
warmer may get a little sloppy. Although she seeks to accurately
apply precedents, much of her motivation stems from her desire to
avoid reversals. Her other main interest is to pull her weight as part
of the trial court team and move the cases. Although she would not
purposefully ignore the precedents, removing the possibility of re-
versal starkly diminishes her incentive to rigorously attempt to
research and understand the law. Appellate waiver grants the bench
warmer the license to expeditiously move cases without fear of re-
versal. This recipe is ripe to produce oversights.
Appellate waiver similarly disincentivizes the bench climber by
removing the case from the appellate conversation. Assured that
the appellate court will not review her rulings, she lacks an outlet to
engage and impress the appellate court. She will devote her time
137. Id.
138. Id. at 88–89.
139. Id. at 92.
140. Id. at 92 & n.101.
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and effort to decisions that are likely to be reviewed at the expense
of those that assuredly will not move on to a higher court.
On the other hand, producing just outcomes is the primary in-
centive of the bench builder, not upward ambitions or fear of
reversal. Appellate waiver will rarely affect the bench builder’s out-
comes; it may, however, affect the presentation. Instead of crafting
well-insulated opinions in order to evade meaningful appellate re-
view, appellate waiver frees the bench builder to plainly state her
true rationale without fear of appellate intermeddling and, in cer-
tain cases, to brazenly flaunt appellate teachings in areas of
disagreement.
Thus, foreknowledge that its decisions will be insulated from ap-
pellate review reduces a trial court’s motivation to closely adhere to
the law of the circuit, whether from lack of effort spent on research-
ing the law, from a decreased aspiration to get it right, or from
seizing an opportunity to achieve the judge’s view of justice even if
that view runs counter to appellate precedent. Appellate waivers de-
crease the likelihood that trial judges will systematically exercise
fidelity to appellate teachings by informing the trial judge at the
outset that her sentencing decisions are virtually unreviewable. In
short, appellate waivers incentivize lawless sentencing in the district
courts.
2. Posner’s Judge as “Labor-Market Participant”
Judge Richard Posner describes judges through a comprehensive
labor-market participant model.141 This model “find[s] that judges
are not moral or intellectual giants (alas), prophets, oracles, mouth-
pieces, or calculating machines. They are all-too-human workers,
responding as other workers do to the conditions of the labor mar-
ket in which they work.”142 Judges desire the same basic goods as
other workers, and their behavior is designed to maximize the at-
tainment of these desires.143
Prospective federal judges are sellers in the labor market, and
the President, with the approval of the Senate, is the buyer. The
141. This model of decision-making integrates nine incomplete theories of judicial be-
havior: the attitudinal, strategic, sociological, psychological, economic, organizational,
pragmatic, phenomenological, and legalist theories. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK
19-56 (2008); see also LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR
OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 30–47 (2013).
142. POSNER, supra note 141, at 7.
143. Id. at 11; see generally Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The
Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. R. 1 (1993); RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOM-
ING LAW 109–44 (1995).
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buyer seeks to appoint “good” judges, but also judges ideologically
tilted in favor of the Administration’s political goals.144 Once ap-
pointed, though, federal judges are well insulated from both the
carrots and the sticks that motivate most workers.145 Judges have few
avenues for promotion146 and no monetary rewards for “superior”
work.147 Likewise, judges have life tenure, and the prospect of im-
peachment is so small that it has little effect on judicial behavior.148
Judges desire a salary, but are not primarily motivated by salary
because they could presumably find more lucrative employment
elsewhere.149 Many enjoy the respect federal judges receive and the
opportunity to exert power over others. Most federal judges “derive
more utility from leisure and public recognition, relative to income,
and are more risk averse, than the average practicing lawyer.”150
Judges also, on the whole, appear to derive intrinsic satisfaction
from being a “good” judge.151 Otherwise federal judges would sim-
ply avoid hard work, given the few true external constraints on their
behavior, and would retire with full pay at the earliest possible mo-
ment.152 Of course, judges may be working for some other goal
such as celebrity or power, but Posner estimates that the attainment
of those goals does not necessarily depend on hard work.153
In short, judges value income and leisure but do not seek to max-
imize either to the exclusion of all else. Most judges want to do a
“good” job, and some aspire to promotion or celebrity. Judicial
competence varies, and less able judges face a more difficult road to
144. POSNER, supra note 141, at 57–58.
145. Id. at 37, 58.
146. But see id. at 142 (conceding that the odds of promotion for judges within the pool
of viably promotable judges may be “short enough . . . to induce a judge to do whatever he
could to rise within the pool”); EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 141, at 35–36, 337–83
(finding inconclusive evidence that some judges alter their behavior in order to increase
their chances of promotion).
147. EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 141, at 33.
148. See id.; see also Posner, supra note 143, at 4–5 (“A federal judge can be lazy, lack
judicial temperament, mistreat his staff, berate without reason the lawyers who appear before
him, be reprimanded for ethical lapses . . . and misbehave in other ways that might get even a
tenured civil servant or university professor fired; he will retain his office.”).
149. See EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 141, at 30–31.
150. See POSNER, supra note 141, at 59–60; see also EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note
141, at 36.
151. POSNER, supra note 141, at 174; POSNER, supra note 143, at 131, 133 (“The pleasure of
judging is bound up with compliance with certain self-limiting rules that define the ‘game’ of
judging.”); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 335–36
(1996).
152. See POSNER, supra note 141, at 60–61 & n.7.
153. Id. at 62; POSNER, supra note 143, at 118 (“[P]restige inheres in the whole judiciary.
Free-rider problems make it unlikely that any one judge will exert himself strenuously to raise
the prestige of all.”).
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achieving distinction and promotion.154 Diminished opportunities
for promotion or recognition may cause less able judges to substi-
tute leisure for work and delegate a substantial amount to law
clerks.155 More able judges can be expected to work harder because
they face fewer barriers to distinction and promotion.156
Regardless of ability, reversal is a disutility for judges.157 Reversal
is a form of criticism and results in more work and less leisure.158
Indeed, “when the heavier constraints of termination or demotion
are inoperative with respect to an employee, the lighter constraint
of criticism can weigh heavily.”159 Judges, therefore, may con-
sciously or unconsciously alter their behavior to avoid reversal even
if that behavior does not align with the judge’s reading of the
precedents or sense of justice.160 In lawless areas, where district
courts have little fear of appellate reversal (such as criminal sen-
tencing before the Sentencing Reform Act), individual judges’
preferences and preconceptions are more likely to play a role in
decision-making because these preferences are not tempered by re-
versal aversion.161 Anything from personal background and traits to
previous employment and experiences can shape such preferences
and preconceptions.162 A similar reliance on individual judges’ his-
tories and biases emerge when formalist judges are faced with a lack
of guidance from the “orthodox materials of decisions.”163 Rela-
tively minor influences are more likely to affect decision-making
when workers’ overall incentives and constraints decrease.164 In the
154. See POSNER, supra note 141, at 65.
155. Id. at 65; see also EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 141, at 36–37.
156. POSNER, supra note 141, at 65.
157. See id. at 70, 141; POSNER, supra note 143, at 118–19. For studies supporting the
existence of reversal aversion, see EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 141, at 83–85, 215.
See also discussion infra Part III.A.3.
158. See EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 141, at 48–49.
159. Id. at 35. But see id. at 83 (noting that judges who do not respect their judicial superi-
ors “might consider reversal a badge of honor and revel in their defiance of superior judicial
authority”).
160. POSNER, supra note 141, at 70–71.
161. Id. at 71–72.
162. Id. at 72–75; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 129–30, 306
(2013).
163. To “fill the void,” judges’ decisions may be influenced by “life experience, personal-
identity characteristics such as race and sex, temperament, ideology (often influenced by
personal-identity characteristics, religion, and party loyalties), ideas of sound public policy
whether or not ideologically inflected, considerations of administrability and workload,
moral beliefs, collegial pressures, public opinion, family background, reading, sentiment and
aversions, [or] even indifference.” Id. at 115.
164. POSNER, supra note 141, at 76; see also EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 141, at
30–47.
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case of district court judges, the removal of the possibility of rever-
sal increases the likelihood that the judge will act based on personal
preferences.
Aside from reversal aversion, backlog pressure from growing
dockets also motivates judges.165 Judges must, at some point, priori-
tize efficiency over perfection, especially at the district court
level.166
Judge Posner labels judges’ failure to “converge on sentencing” a
“serious problem” and identifies a need for judicial education in “a
coherent, evidence-based theory of criminal punishment.”167 By en-
hancing the finality of the district court’s rulings, appellate waivers
alleviate both the threat of reversal and docket pressures. Removing
the constraint of reversal, appellate waivers increase the likelihood
that personal preferences will play a greater role in sentencing. In
this way, appellate waivers return district courts to the pre-SRA era
of effectively unreviewable sentencing discretion.168 As discussed
above, this period was marked by the perception that similarly-situ-
ated defendants received unacceptably disparate sentences.169
Thus, structuring sentencing appellate waivers so that district courts
know up front that their sentencing rulings are unreviewable in-
creases the likelihood that personal biases will play a greater role in
the sentencing process and decreases the likelihood that different
judges will arrive at similar sentencing outcomes.
3. Empirical Research on Judicial Sentencing Behavior
Max Schanzenbach’s empirical research supports the hypothesis
that appellate review and the political composition of the reviewing
court affect the sentencing behavior of district court judges. A study
165. POSNER, supra note 141, at 141.
166. According to Judge Friendly, “[t]he district courts know what their business is—
disposing of cases by trial or settlement with fairness and with the optimum blend of prompt
decision and rightness of result; they also have the responsibility of demonstrating the quality
of federal justice to ordinary citizens—parties, witnesses and jurors.” Henry J. Friendly, The
“Law of the Circuit” and All That, 46 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 406, 406–07 (1972) (internal footnote
omitted); see also id. at 407 n.6 (opining that the “greatest district judges [are not] those who
stew for months and then write a long opinion on a novel point of law concerning which they
are almost certain not to have the last word”); POSNER, supra note 151, at 336–37 (quoting
Judge Friendly); POSNER, supra note 162, at 288.
167. POSNER, supra note 162, at 314; see also generally Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Into the Twi-
light Zone: Informing Judicial Discretion in Federal Sentencing, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 591 (2009)
(urging the use of cultural-competence and social-cognition training to reduce the influence
of implicit biases and associations in federal sentencing).
168. See supra Part II.B.3.
169. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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by Schanzenbach and Emerson Tiller analyzed variations in district
court sentencing behavior based on whether the district court was
politically aligned with the court of appeals.170 The Schanzenbach-
Tiller study found that Democrat-appointed district court judges
gave shorter sentences for street crimes than Republican-appointed
district court judges.171 District court judges of both parties used
fact-based, offense-level adjustments, which are deferentially re-
viewed, to bring the Guidelines sentence in closer alignment with
their sentencing preferences.172 However, Democrat-appointed dis-
trict court judges were more likely to use Guidelines departures,
which are subject to stricter appellate review, to further shorten the
sentence in circuits with majority Democrat-appointed circuit court
judges than in circuits with majority Republican-appointed circuit
court judges.173 The political orientation of the circuit court did not
meaningfully affect the Republican-appointed district court judges’
frequency of upward departures.174 The authors deemed the lack of
increased frequency of upward departures by Republican-ap-
pointed district court judges in aligned circuits unsurprising
because upward departures are quite rare, Guidelines sentences for
street-level crimes are already quite harsh, longer sentences can be
achieved by manipulating adjustments, and defendants almost al-
ways appeal upward departures, which, therefore, make them
unattractive to district court judges.175
A second Schanzenbach-Tiller study using the actual identities of
sentencing judges confirmed the results of the earlier study.176 The
first study used a larger sample size, but only approximated the po-
litical alignment of the district court based on the political
composition of the judges in the district.177 Using a smaller sample,
170. Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Strategic Judging Under the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines: Positive Political Theory and Evidence, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24 (2007).
171. Id. at 43.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 47–52. A later study similarly found that an increase in Republican-appointed
judges on the court of appeals results in longer sentences and reduces the frequency of
below Guidelines sentences. EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 141, at 246, 253; see also
Joshua B. Fischman & Max M. Schanzenbach, Do Standards of Review Matter? The Case of Federal
Criminal Sentencing, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 405, 422–24 (2011) (“Moving from a circuit with 25
percent Democrats to a circuit with 75 percent Democrats . . . increases departures by about
6 percentage points.”).
174. Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 170, at 49.
175. Id.
176. See Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines:
Judicial Politics, Empirical Evidence, and Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 715, 723, 724 (2008).
177. The Sentencing Commission does not publicly release the identity of the sentencing
judge in its statistics. See id. at 728–29, 740–43.
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the second study matched sentencing decisions to individual dis-
trict court judges. Using this “judge-level data,” Schanzenbach and
Tiller found that Democrat-appointed judges imposed approxi-
mately ten percent shorter sentences than Republican-appointed
judges for “serious offenses.”178 However, Democratic appointees
were more likely to employ departures in circuits where the major-
ity of appellate judges were themselves Democratic appointees.179
They were also more likely to employ fact-based offense level adjust-
ments, which are reviewed under a less searching standard of
review, in circuits where the majority of appellate judges were Re-
publican appointees.180 This evidence suggests that district court
judges strategically alter their calculations to avoid reversal. This be-
havior strongly demonstrates that reversal acts as a sentencing
constraint.
A later study by Joshua Fischman and Schanzenbach found that
“district judges are meaningfully constrained by the prospect of ap-
pellate reversal” when sentencing.181 The Fischman-Schanzenbach
study analyzed the differential between sentences imposed by Dem-
ocrat-appointed district court judges and those imposed by
Republican-appointed district court judges across time periods in
which appellate courts applied different levels of scrutiny to sen-
tencing decisions.182 The study found that interparty sentencing
disparity was significant only during periods of deferential review.183
District court judges’ sensitivity to the changing standards of review
for sentencing decisions suggests “that these judges are strategically
modifying their behavior in response to the likelihood of rever-
sal.”184 In other words, district court judges are averse to reversal
and modify their behavior—including the severity of an offender’s
sentence—to minimize the risk of reversal. The study found, how-
ever, that district court judges who were appointed before the
implementation of the Guidelines in 1987 did not modify their be-
havior as a consequence of changing standards of review.185 The
study hypothesized that these judges were likely less averse to rever-
sal because they did not respect the Guidelines and, therefore,
faced lower legitimacy costs when appellate courts reversed their
178. Id. at 734.
179. Id. at 735.
180. Id. at 736.
181. Fischman & Schanzenbach, supra note 173, at 405.
182. The party of the appointing president is significantly correlated with sentencing
preferences; district court judges appointed by Democratic presidents favor shorter
sentences than district court judges appointed by Republican presidents. See id. at 406, 422.
183. Id. at 424.
184. Id. at 407.
185. See id. at 426.
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sentencing decisions.186 The study concluded that although “aver-
sion to reversal acts as a constraint on the behavior of district
judges, its impact may be heterogeneous and depend upon the per-
ceived legitimacy of the guidelines.”187
These studies confirm that district court judges who respect the
legitimacy of the Guidelines are averse to reversal of their sentenc-
ing decisions and modify their behavior accordingly.188 Stephanos
Bibas, Schanzenbach, and Tiller identified the threat of reversal as
a “key component” of the Guidelines system that “constrains sen-
tencing courts ex ante.”189 In order to temper the effect of judges’
ideological beliefs on sentencing, the authors proposed a system in
which a diversity of political viewpoints is institutionalized into the
appellate review of sentences.190 The essay specifically identified the
proliferation of appellate waivers as a barrier to policing district
courts’ sentencing practices because broad waivers “signal to sen-
tencing judges that they can sentence without regard to sentencing
law or policy.”191
Although no one has precisely measured the effect of appellate
waivers on sentencing behavior, these studies confirm that remov-
ing the realistic possibility of reversal almost certainly affects
sentencing practices. District court judges have sentencing prefer-
ences, strategically manipulate Guidelines calculations to further
those preferences, and labor under an aversion to reversal. These
findings support the hypothesis that district court judges, when
186. Id. at 418, 431.
187. Id. at 431.
188. See Christina L. Boyd & James F. Spriggs II, An Examination of Strategic Anticipation of
Appellate Court Preferences by Federal District Court Judges, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 37, 51–53
(2009). One study appears to undermine claims that reversal aversion shapes judicial behav-
ior. See Donald R. Songer, Martha Humphries Ginn & Tammy A. Sarver, Do Judges Follow the
Law When There Is No Fear of Reversal?, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 137 (2003). This study, however, ana-
lyzed federal appellate court decisions in diversity tort actions (which are categorically unlikely
to be reviewed by the Supreme Court) and found that law and precedent constrained the
appellate courts’ decisions despite the low likelihood of reversal. Federal appellate courts—
which operate in three judge panels—have institutional constraints that engender adherence
to precedent that are absent at the district court level. In effect, “somebody” is always watch-
ing appellate decision makers. See VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER, STEPHANIE A. LINDQUIST & WENDY
L. MARTINEK, JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION
MAKING (2006) (claiming that the likelihood of arbitrary or extreme decisions is reduced at
the appellate level by the moderating influence of alternative points of view); see also FRANK
M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL APPELLATE BENCH 58–59
(1980). The moderating influence of judicial panels is not present at the district court level.
See POSNER, supra note 151, at 340 (noting that the isolation of district court judges creates
the temptation for lawlessness and tyranny).
189. Stephanos Bibas, Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Policing Politics at Sen-
tencing, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1371, 1371 (2009).
190. Id. at 1391–94; see also Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 176, at 743–47.
191. Bibas, Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 189, at 1395.
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faced with the prospect of virtually no chance of appellate review,
are more likely to impose sentences on the basis of personal prefer-
ences to the detriment of uniformity in sentencing.
B. Pre-Plea Bargaining for Sentencing Appellate Waivers is Inefficient
Both the government and the defendant lack valuable informa-
tion at the plea-bargaining stage. Neither knows whether the
district court will adhere to the statutory procedure for imposing
the sentence, and neither knows the outcome of the sentencing
hearing. Thus, the defendant cannot accurately gauge her content-
ment with the sentence. Likewise, the government cannot
accurately gauge the likelihood that the defendant will appeal the
sentence, the likelihood such an appeal would succeed, or the re-
sources that an appeal would consume. If the defendant has only
frivolous grounds for appeal, both parties may set a low price on
the defendant’s appellate waiver. If the defendant has potentially
meritorious grounds for appeal, both parties will likely value the
defendant’s appellate waiver more dearly. At the time of the plea
agreement, however, the parties lack critical information about the
procedure and substantive outcome of the defendant’s sentencing
hearing.
Uncertainty impedes using cost-benefit analysis to efficiently bar-
gain unless both parties view the relevant probabilities similarly.192
If the parties can accurately predict the likelihood of some future
event, then they can set the price of the good based on the likeli-
hood of its occurrence. If both parties know that there is a fifty
percent probability that a painting is a worthless forgery and a fifty
percent probability that the painting is a masterpiece worth
$10,000, the parties can apply a discount based on the likelihood
that the work is a forgery and strike a deal to sell the painting for
$5,000. Conversely, a deal may be impossible if the parties estimate
the probabilities differently. If the seller believes that there is only a
twenty percent chance that the painting is a forgery, and the buyer
believes that there is a fifty percent chance that the painting is a
forgery, the parties will not be able to reach an agreement. The
seller will insist on at least $8,000 for the painting, but the buyer will
not pay more than $5,000. Moreover, even if both parties place the
192. POSNER, supra note 128, § 1.1; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, What’s So Special About
Judges?, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 773, 780 (1990) (“Cases can be settled when parties agree on the
likely outcome. When there are no rules of law, when the judge must apply his own weights
to inconsistent factors, agreement is less likely.”); Teeter, supra note 35, at 746 (“Uncertainty
is the enemy of the plea bargaining system.”).
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likelihood that the painting is a forgery at fifty percent, they still
may not agree on a price depending on their relative aversions to
risk. Most people are risk averse and, as buyers, would rather keep
$5,000 than gamble it on an equal probability of ending up with
either $10,000 or nothing.193
For the defendant, the downside of judicial error at sentencing is
quite high. An error that increases the defendant’s sentence results
in a very real cost. An individual defendant has relatively little expe-
rience in federal sentencing and likely no experience with the
particular sentencing judge.194 Thus, the defendant has little infor-
mation about the likelihood for sentencing error and associates a
high cost with such error. A high level of uncertainty about a high
stakes outcome will lead a cautious defendant to place a higher
price on her appellate rights than is warranted.
The government likely has a long history of observing the sen-
tencing behavior of an individual judge. Assuming that the judge is
not especially prone to sentencing error or abuse, the government
will predict that the defendant is unlikely to have a meritorious ba-
sis for a sentencing appeal. Therefore, from the government’s
perspective, appellate rights are not especially valuable, and most
defendants should barter them cheaply and almost as a matter of
course.
Because of the inherent uncertainty in the value of future appel-
late rights, bargaining over sentencing appellate waivers at the pre-
plea stage results in inefficient or aborted appellate waiver bar-
gains.195 During plea bargaining, the parties are merely guessing at
the probable value of the defendant’s appellate rights given the
scant information available. Moreover, the plea agreement does not
increase certainty in any particular outcome—the plea agreement
only ensures conviction, not the amount of punishment.196 Drawing
a parallel to civil litigation, it would be as if the parties settled the
liability aspect of a lawsuit, but left the issue of damages to the
court’s unreviewable discretion. Uncertainty is greatly diminished
after the sentencing hearing, however, and both parties should be
able to fairly accurately value the defendant’s appellate rights at
193. See POSNER, supra note 128, § 1.2; see also Oren Gazal-Ayal & Avishalom Tor, The
Innocence Effect, 62 DUKE L.J. 339, 374–75 (2012).
194. Even if the defendant’s attorney has a wealth of sentencing experience before the
judge, the defendant is likely to discount such secondhand information.
195. The inability to reach an appellate waiver agreement may inhibit the parties from
striking a plea bargain at all.
196. “C” pleas, discussed supra note 10 and accompanying text, are an exception. In these
pleas the parties bargain for a particular sentencing outcome that is binding on the court if
the court accepts the plea agreement. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C).
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that time. Thus, negotiations should be quick and efficient,
whether or not the parties reach an appellate waiver agreement,
based on knowledge of the actual procedure and outcome of the
sentencing hearing.
C. Lack of Meaningful Enforcement Fails to Disincentivize Breach
Another significant drawback of folding sentencing appellate
waivers into the larger plea agreement is the difficulty in imposing
consequences for the breach of the appellate waiver. A defendant
who appeals in violation of her appellate waiver faces the prospect
that the appellate court will dismiss her appeal. Dismissal places the
defendant in a position no worse than if she had abided by her
appellate waiver agreement and withheld filing a notice of appeal;
the defendant has lost nothing. In the meantime, judicial and gov-
ernment resources are expended in docketing the appeal, moving
to dismiss the appeal, and ruling on the motion to dismiss. Even if
dismissed, an appeal in violation of an appellate waiver destroys
many of the resource-saving benefits that motivate the government
to enter into appellate waivers. Additionally, future defendants’ ap-
pellate waivers lose value every time a defendant appeals in
violation of her appellate waiver as the government loses faith that
defendants will abide by their agreements. To deter defendants
from appealing in violation of their appellate waiver agreements,
some sanction is necessary beyond mere dismissal of the appeal.
Some appellate opinions have invited the government to rescind
the plea agreement upon finding that a defendant violated the ap-
pellate waiver provision.197 Rescinding the plea agreement allows
the government to reinstate dismissed charges, but also requires it
to start the prosecution over at square one. That result is unpalat-
able to many prosecutors, who would rather let sunk costs stay sunk
and move forward with new prosecutions. Thus, defendants face no
197. Judge Easterbrook has authored opinions that, on several occasions, have invited the
government to reinstate dismissed charges in response to a defendant’s breach of an appel-
late waiver provision. See, e.g., United States v. Whitlow, 287 F.3d 638, 640–41 (7th Cir. 2002);
United States v. Hare, 269 F.3d 859, 862–63 (7th Cir. 2001). But Judge Easterbrook’s invita-
tions have drawn criticism. See Whitlow, 287 F.3d at 642–43 (Diane P. Wood, J., concurring);
see also Bennardo, supra note 5, at 544–45. The First Circuit has likewise stated that by appeal-
ing in violation of an appellate waiver provision, “defendants will risk giving the government
an option to disclaim a plea agreement, if it wishes to do so.” United States v. Teeter, 257
F.3d 14, 26 (1st Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Erwin, 765 F.3d 219, 228–32 (3d Cir. 2014)
(remanding for resentencing in case where the government alleged that the defendant’s
violation of the appellate waiver in his plea agreement alleviated it of its obligation to move
for a downward departure for substantial assistance under an intertwined cooperation
agreement).
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realistic downside to breaching appellate waiver provisions, and the
government and judiciary must expend significant resources to dis-
pose of breaching defendants’ appeals.
IV. A PROPOSED POST-SENTENCING APPELLATE WAIVER SYSTEM
Sentencing appellate waivers do not need to be abolished or
made contingent on the sentencing court imposing a particular
sentence. Procedural reform, however, would improve the system.
A post-sentencing appellate waiver system where the defendant and
the government enter into a sentencing appellate waiver agreement
only after the imposition of the sentence would rectify many of the
problems that beleaguer current sentencing appellate waivers:198
concerns about the defendant’s voluntariness and knowledge when
deciding whether to waive her appeal, fear of lawless district court
judges ignoring proper sentencing practices, and the lack of mean-
ingful incentives to deter defendants from breaching their
appellate waivers. Although post-sentencing appellate waivers will
consume additional trial-level resources, the proposed system will
save appellate-level resources and increase efficiency in the broader
plea-bargaining process.
A. The Mechanics of a Post-Sentencing Appellate Waiver System
After the sentencing hearing, the district court enters its judg-
ment into the record.199 The judgment is often entered on the
same day as the sentencing hearing. Federal criminal defendants
then have fourteen days to file a notice of appeal.200 In a system that
provides for post-sentencing appellate waivers, the defendant and
the government could use this fourteen-day appeal period to agree
to an appellate waiver. The government’s consideration would
likely take the form of some reduction in punishment, such as less
time in prison, a smaller fine, a reduction of supervised release, or
less onerous conditions of supervision. If the parties reach an agree-
ment, the government would move the district court for a
198. The defendant would remain free to waive her right to appeal her conviction in the
plea agreement. Because the guilty plea is contemporaneous with the conviction, a plea
agreement that waives appeal of errors attendant to the conviction does not present the same
sorts of problems as a prospective waiver of the right to appeal errors in a future sentencing
hearing.
199. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(k)(1).
200. FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1)(A). This appeal period is not jurisdictional. See, e.g., Virgin
Islands v. Martinez, 620 F.3d 321, 327 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2010).
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reduction of the sentence within the appeal period.201 This motion
could be styled as a “Motion to Reduce Sentence for Acceptance of
Punishment.”
Filing the motion would toll the appeal period. The district court
would conduct a hearing to ensure that the defendant knowingly
and voluntarily entered into the appellate waiver agreement. The
district court would be free to accept or reject the appellate waiver
agreement. If it accepted the agreement, the district court would
grant the motion to reduce the sentence and amend the judg-
ment.202 If, on the other hand, the district court rejected the
appellate waiver agreement and denied the motion, the tolling of
the original appeal period would be lifted. The parties could at-
tempt to negotiate another appellate waiver agreement, or the
defendant could file (or not file) a notice of appeal.
Adopting this post-judgment appellate waiver mechanism would
require a new or amended rule of criminal procedure. The proce-
dural rule would fit well as an amendment to Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 35, alongside other methods for correcting or
reducing a previously-imposed sentence.203 Such a rule would not
be without precedent; the federal rules currently provide mecha-
nisms for various post-judgment motions, including motions for a
new trial,204 for a correction of a clear technical or arithmetic er-
ror,205 or for a reduction of sentence for substantial assistance to
the government.206
201. The entry of judgment does not divest the district court of jurisdiction to hear such a
motion. Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (allowing a government motion to reduce sentence for
substantial assistance within one year of sentencing or even later in certain instances).
202. The process to amend the judgment would work much in the same way that district
courts currently reduce sentences in response to post-sentencing motions based on the de-
fendant’s substantial assistance to the government. Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b). In the
proposed system, the amended judgment would begin the fourteen-day appeal period anew.
Even with a valid appellate waiver in place, the defendant would be free to appeal issues that
fall outside the scope of the waiver or are unwaivable.
203. Placement within Rule 35 would also alleviate the need for new statutory authoriza-
tion. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B) (2012) (authorizing courts to modify an imposed term of
imprisonment as permitted by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35).
204. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 33.
205. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a); see also 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & SARAH N. WELLING,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 613 (4th ed. 2011); United States v. Morillo, 8 F.3d 864,
868 n.5 (1st Cir. 1993).
206. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b).
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B. Consequences of a Post-Sentencing Appellate Waiver System
1. Advantages Relative to the Current System
Postponing appellate waiver bargaining until after the sentenc-
ing hearing offers significant advantages over the current system.
These benefits address concerns regarding the knowledge and vol-
untariness of the waivers and the efficiency- and incentive-based
concerns detailed in the previous Sections.
First, post-sentencing appellate waivers erase any doubt regard-
ing the defendant’s ability to enter into a knowing and voluntary
waiver. Although individual defendants may still raise challenges to
the knowing and voluntary nature of post-sentencing appellate
waivers, such waivers could not be found per se unknowing or invol-
untary. After the hearing, the defendant is fully informed about the
sentence’s terms and the procedure the court employed in impos-
ing that sentence. Thus, the defendant can estimate her likelihood
for success on appeal and intelligently choose whether to bargain
with her right to appeal. By moving the appellate waiver negotia-
tion after the sentencing hearing, the defendant is no longer
bargaining away the right to appeal the unknown errors of a future
proceeding.
Second, and relatedly, both parties are able to more accurately
value the defendant’s appellate rights after the sentencing hearing.
With a complete picture of the sentencing outcome and process,
both parties can assess the likely appellate outcome, and the gov-
ernment can weigh the anticipated expenditure of resources in
defending the sentence against an appeal. Because both of the par-
ties’ assessments would be better informed, their valuations of the
defendant’s appellate rights are more likely to converge. Addition-
ally, because more accurate information would be available, the
appellate waiver bargain is more likely to accurately reflect the true
value of the defendant’s appellate rights. Defendants with poten-
tially meritorious appellate claims are less likely to undervalue those
claims and defendants with only frivolous claims are less likely to
overvalue those claims. The government is also more likely to offer
a reciprocal benefit commensurate with the actual merit of the indi-
vidual defendant’s potential appellate claims.
Third, separating the appellate waiver agreement from the larger
plea bargain ensures that the defendant receives some additional
consideration in exchange for her promise not to appeal. The de-
fendant will not waive her appellate right for nothing. Thus, it is
fair to conclude that whatever consideration she accepts in ex-
change for her right to appeal her sentence is adequate. Separating
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the appellate waiver from the plea agreement ensures that the de-
fendant receives some additional incremental consideration for her
promise not to appeal, even though the sum total of the govern-
ment’s concessions may be identical to those if the sentencing
appellate waiver had been included in the plea agreement because
the government may offer less at the plea-bargaining stage.
Fourth, separating the sentencing appellate waiver from the
larger plea agreement permits the defendant to reject the appellate
waiver without rejecting the plea agreement.207 Vice versa, the de-
fendant can enter into a sentencing appellate waiver agreement
even if the parties had no plea agreement or the defendant was
found guilty at trial. Appellate waivers do not naturally belong in
plea agreements. Plea agreements focus on the defendant’s admis-
sion of guilt. Sentencing appellate waivers concern the defendant’s
acceptance of the district court’s sentence. The absence of one
should not impede the existence of the other.
Fifth, delaying sentencing appellate waiver agreements until after
the sentencing hearing will remove the incentive distortion created
by plea-agreement sentencing appellate waivers. Because neither
the parties nor the district court will know whether an appellate
waiver will occur until after the sentencing hearing, all parties will
have an incentive to conduct the hearing properly. Because every
potential sentencing error may translate into additional conces-
sions by the prosecutor to secure a post-sentencing appellate
waiver, the prosecutor has an added incentive to ensure that the
district court conducts the hearing according to proper procedure.
Incentivizing stricter adherence to the procedural and substantive
reasonableness requirements of federal sentencing will further re-
duce disparities in sentences among similarly situated defendants.
Sixth, defendants will be less likely to violate the waiver by ap-
pealing. By executing the waiver during the appeal period,
defendants will be less likely to second-guess their waiver deci-
sions.208 Rather than waiving the right to appeal some unknown
future sentence months in advance, defendants would decide
whether to execute post-sentencing appellate waivers during the
207. Federal prosecutors in some districts require defendants to waive their right to ap-
peal their sentence as a provision of the plea agreement. In those districts, some defendants
reject the plea agreement and opt to plea open or go to trial in order to protect their right to
appeal their sentence. See King & O’Neill, supra note 3, at 251–52. Separating the sentencing
appellate waiver from the greater plea bargain would allow the parties to enter into a plea
bargain even if they did not later enter into a sentencing appellate waiver agreement.
208. See Haines, Jr., supra note 5, at 228 (suggesting that a lengthy “cooling off” period
after striking a plea bargain gives “the defendant time to experience ‘buyer’s remorse’ and
repudiate the plea agreement.”).
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fourteen-day appeal period immediately following the district
court’s judgment. Defendants are less likely to suffer from buyer’s
remorse in the two weeks after entering into an appellate waiver
with full knowledge of their sentence than under the current sys-
tem, in which defendants must decide whether to waive their right
to appeal months in advance of the sentencing hearing.
Additionally, defendants would be less likely to appeal in viola-
tion of the waiver because separating the appellate waiver from the
plea agreement allows for actual enforcement of the appellate
waiver beyond dismissal of the appeal. Defendants currently suffer
no penalty, and therefore no disincentive, for breaching their ap-
pellate waiver agreements beyond dismissal of their appeal. Because
post-sentencing appellate waiver agreements would be independent
of plea agreements, the government could penalize a defendant for
breaching the appellate waiver agreement while maintaining the
plea agreement’s integrity. If a defendant violated her post-sentenc-
ing appellate waiver agreement, the government could move for
the district court to rescind the benefit conferred upon the defen-
dant. Thus, a breaching defendant would lose the benefit of the
appellate waiver bargain while keeping the guilty plea intact. By im-
posing real consequences for the violation of an appellate waiver,
post-sentencing appellate waiver agreements will deter breaches.
2. Responses to Anticipated Criticisms
Two anticipated criticisms of a post-sentencing appellate waiver
system are the expenditure of additional resources necessary to ad-
minister such a system and the concern that the imposition of a
lesser punishment is not merited in exchange for a defendant’s for-
bearance of her right to appeal her sentence. The first criticism is a
true drawback of the post-sentencing waiver system, but the relative
benefits of the proposal outweigh it. The second criticism is ill-
founded.
First, critics might argue that post-sentencing appellate waivers
will likely require the expenditure of more resources than the cur-
rent system. Under the current system, the government and the
defendant engage in one round of plea negotiations. The post-sen-
tencing appellate waiver system creates the potential for a second
round of negotiations. Assuming that an appellate waiver agree-
ment is struck, the district court must hold essentially a second Rule
11 hearing to review the appellate waiver agreement and ensure
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that the defendant entered into the agreement knowingly and vol-
untarily. The addition of these steps is not insignificant in terms of
resource consumption.
As discussed above, however, post-sentencing appellate waivers
will lead to efficiency gains in other parts of the criminal justice
system. Fewer defendants will be likely to violate post-sentencing ap-
pellate waiver agreements because breaching the agreement will
carry real consequences. This reduction in appeals that are des-
tined for dismissal will save appellate-level judicial, prosecutorial,
and governmental defense resources.209 Federal defenders will be
spared the need to file opening briefs only to later respond to mo-
tions to dismiss on the basis of appellate waivers. Prosecutors will be
spared the burden of moving to dismiss on the basis of appellate
waivers. Federal appellate courts will be spared the burden of ruling
on motions to dismiss based on appellate waivers and scouring the
record as the result of frivolous Anders appeals.210 These resource
savings are likely to be substantial, albeit centered in the appellate
sphere.211 Post-sentencing appellate waivers will undeniably add
work at the district court level.
Conservation of resources, however, cannot be the overriding
goal of the criminal justice system. Otherwise, we could forgo trials
and appeals in the name of resource conservation. Conserving re-
sources is only a worthy pursuit when the system that conserves
resources leads to the same results as the more costly one.212 Just
results trump resource conservation. The expenditure of additional
resources required by post-sentencing appellate waivers is justified
because it achieves more just results.
A second possible criticism of the proposed system is that it ex-
plicitly trades defendants’ appellate rights for punishment
reductions. A newly-sentenced defendant may find that even a mod-
est-but-certain sentence reduction is an irresistible carrot and trade
away her appellate rights, especially if she has only borderline ap-
pellate issues. Other defendants who never harbored an intention
209. The government funds many defendants’ attorneys in the form of federal public
defenders or attorneys appointed pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A
(2012).
210. See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text.
211. It is difficult to predict whether the proposed system would lead to the execution of
more or fewer appellate waiver agreements. Defendants may feel more comfortable waiving
their appellate rights after the sentencing hearing because they are content with the out-
come. On the other hand, defendants who are unhappy with the sentencing outcome may
decline to waive appellate rights. The government may decline to enter into appellate waiver
agreements where the defendant lacks any meritorious appellate argument.
212. For example, motions for summary judgment should only be granted when the mov-
ing party would have prevailed at trial.
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to appeal may threaten appeal just to extract even the most modest
benefit from the prosecution.
The above scenarios do not give rise to legitimate concerns. De-
fendants purportedly receive benefits in exchange for their
appellate waivers under the current system,213 so severing the appel-
late waiver agreement and making the consideration explicit
should not raise any new eyebrows. Moreover, defendants have
every right to rationally weigh the relative attractiveness of bargain-
ing their appellate rights even for modest punishment reductions.
To many, a modest-but-certain sentence reduction may be more en-
ticing than a speculative appeal. Defendants are capable of making
these determinations, and the system should permit them to do so.
After all, they must live with the consequences.
All else being equal, defendants who agree not to appeal (and
then abide by that promise) should receive less punishment than
defendants who press frivolous claims through every available level
of the court system. Similar to defendants who receive lower sen-
tence calculations for pleading guilty and “accepting
responsibility,”214 defendants who “accept punishment” by waiving
their appellate rights deserve less punishment than defendants who
fight their punishment tooth and nail. Defendants who accept their
punishment are likely easier to rehabilitate. To the extent that ac-
ceptance of punishment and responsibility correlates with a lesser
likelihood of future dangerousness, society has less of an interest in
incapacitating or specifically deterring non-appealing defend-
ants.215 Strict retributivists may be unsatisfied with a determination
that non-appealing defendants receive a smaller desert, but the
concept should be no less palatable than reducing the punishment
of a defendant who pleads guilty and receives a sentence reduction
for acceptance of responsibility.
CONCLUSION
Sentencing appellate waivers are not inherently problematic.
Rather, it is the timing of the waivers that creates problems. The
parties cannot efficiently bargain over a plea-agreement provision
that they cannot accurately value, and they cannot accurately value
213. See King & O’Neill, supra note 3, at 232–35.
214. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2013).
215. But see King & O’Neill, supra note 3, at 260 (opining that defendants who agree to
appellate waivers are “no less culpable or easier to rehabilitate” and “may simply be oppor-
tunists” seeking less punishment). The same claim could be made of defendants who elect to
plead guilty in exchange for a punishment reduction.
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a defendant’s promise not to appeal her sentence until after the
sentence has been imposed. Although this valuation problem does
not rise to the level of an unknowing or involuntary waiver, it does
leave some plea agreements unconsummated and others lopsided.
Postponing the sentencing appellate waiver agreement until after
the sentencing hearing will restore the threat of potential reversal
to the sentencing process, thereby better incentivizing district court
judges to adhere to proper sentencing procedures. Defendants will
also be less likely to breach separate sentencing appellate waiver
agreements for fear of losing the incremental benefit received in
exchange for their promise not to appeal. In short, postponing the
appellate waiver agreement until after the sentencing hearing will
lead to better bargaining, better sentencing, and better adherence
to the terms of appellate waiver agreements.
